Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
JAN 15 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1976

No. 76-984

ROBERT GEORGE DRUMMOND and MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,

Petitioners,

vs.

FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Margie Pitts Hames
Mary Ann B. Oakley
794 Juniper Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

Neil Bradley
52 Fairlie Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONERS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page(s)
Opinion Below	1
Jurisdiction	2
Questions Presented for Review	2, 3
Statement of the Case	4
Reasons for Granting the Writ	14
I. Important Similar Issues Involving Due Process Rights Of Foster Children And Foster Parents Are Already Pending Before The Court.	14
II. Where Practitioners Alleged That Race Was Used As An Impermissible Factor In The Respondents' Decision To Remove The Child From The Drummonds' Home And Place Him Elsewhere For Adoption The Court Below Erred In Ruling That There Was No Standing To Raise The Denial Of Equal Protection Claim. This Holding Is	

In Clear Conflict With Prior Decisions Of This Court. 16

III. Where Petitioners Assert That Their De Facto Custody Of Timmy Has Resulted In A Psychological Parent-Child Relationship, Such Custody Should Not Arbitrarily And Capriciously Be Changed; Such A Fundamental Relationship Should Not Be Terminated Without Due Process Of Law Being Afforded To Both The Foster Child And The Foster Parents 17

Conclusion 20

Appendix 1A-33A

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases - Federal — Page(s)

Bishop v. Wood, __U.S.__, 96 S.Ct. 2074 (1976) 17

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 14,17

Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family and Childrens Services, 408 F.Supp. 382 (N.D.Ga. 1976). . . 7

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) 12

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) 15

Rodriquez v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, No. 76-5193, __U.S. __, 45 U.S.L.W. 3320 (October 26, 1976). 14, 16

Shapiro v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, No. 76-183, __U.S.__, 45 U.S.L.W. 3272 (October 12, 1976). 14, 16

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, No. 76-180, __U.S.__, 45 U.S.L.W. 3272, (October 12, 1976) 14, 16

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 15

Cases - State

In re: B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679 (1974) 19

In re: Confessora B., 348 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1973) . . . 19

Katzoff v. Superior Court, 2 F.L.R. 2232 (Cal. Ct. App., Feb. 1976). . 19

Statutes

Ga. Code Ann. §79-103
Ga. Code Ann. §53-312

Other Authorities

Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child 19

Model Custody Act, American Bar Association, Family Law Section, 1963. 18

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1976

No. _____

ROBERT GEORGE DRUMMOND and MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,

Petitioners,

vs.

FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Petitioners, Robert George Drummond and Mildred Pauline Drummond, pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia entered on September 7, 1976.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia affirming the decision of the Superior Court for Fulton County,

Georgia, is reported at 237 Ga. 449, __ SE2d __(1976) and is appended hereto at 1-A. The findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the Superior Court for Fulton County, Georgia, are appended hereto beginning 14-A and 17-A. The order denying rehearing is appended hereto beginning at 29-A.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia was entered on September 7, 1975. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1257(3), 2101(c) and Rule 22.3, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. On November 30, 1976, Mr. Justice Powell entered an order extending the time for filing a petition for certiorari in this case to and including January 15, 1977.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. WHETHER PETITIONERS, WHO ARE CAUCASIAN AND WHO ALLEGE A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION BECAUSE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE RESPONDENTS' REFUSAL TO CONSENT TO PETITIONERS' ADOPTION OF A RACIALLY MIXED CHILD.

II. WHETHER PETITIONERS, WHO WERE FOSTER PARENTS TO A CHILD FROM AGE ONE MONTH UNTIL TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS, HAVE ANY RIGHTS GUARANTEED

BY THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WHEN A DECISION IS MADE TO REMOVE THAT CHILD FROM PETITIONERS' HOME (HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL PARENTS) AND PLACE HIM ELSEWHERE FOR ADOPTION.

III. WHETHER A STATE MAY TERMINATE NATURAL PARENTAL RIGHTS AND INVEST IN A STATE AGENCY "ABSOLUTE DISCRETION" OVER THE WELFARE OF A CHILD SUCH THAT NO ONE, INCLUDING FOSTER PARENTS OR THE CHILD HIMSELF IF HE BE UNDER THE AGE OF FOURTEEN YEARS, HAS STANDING TO CONTEST THE DECISIONS OF THE AGENCY.

IV. WHETHER THE CHILD WAS ENTITLED TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM TO REPRESENT HIS INTERESTS AND TO ASSERT HIS RIGHT TO A PRE-REMOVAL HEARING (AND OTHER DUE PROCESS RIGHTS) FROM HIS ONLY KNOWN "PARENTS", HIS FOSTER PARENTS OF TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS.

V. WHETHER THE CHILD, WHO IS RACIALLY MIXED, WAS DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WHEN THE DEFENDANTS DECIDED HE SHOULD BE PLACED IN A BLACK ADOPTIVE HOME AND REFUSED TO CONSENT TO HIS ADOPTION BY HIS WHITE FOSTER PARENTS OF TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners, Robert George Drummond and Mildred Pauline Drummond, are husband and wife and had the care of Timothy (Timmy) Lee Hill from December, 1973 until May, 1976. The child was placed with the Drummonds as a foster child by the Fulton County Department of Family and Childrens Services (hereinafter DFACS). Timmy is a child with olive skin, brown eyes and brown curly hair. His mother is Caucasian, the identity of his father has not been established but it is believed that he is black. Timmy was 28 days old at the time of placement in the Drummond home. Petitioners after about six months sought to adopt Timmy but as early as March 1, 1975, they were told by defendants supervisors that he would "make a better adjustment and have a better life with a black couple in a black community." (T. 334-45). In September of 1975, the parental rights of the natural mother of Timmy were terminated by court order and he became available for adoption. Petitioners again sought to adopt Timmy, however, after an agency "staffing"[1] in which the decision was made, petitioners were told the agency

---

[1] The "staffing" consisted of 18 social workers only one of whom had ever visited the Drummond home. The foster home worker was excluded from the meeting because it was known she favored the adoption.

was seeking a black home for the child and that they thought the child would be better off in a black home. This decision was made even though the placement case worker recommended that Timmy be adopted by the Drummonds. The quality of care and stimulation given the child were admittedly excellent, however, the decision as reflected in the agency files was to seek a black home for Timmy. As set forth above, this decision was made at a "staffing" of case workers at which neither petitioners nor the child were present or were given an opportunity to be heard. The memorandum (Exhibit 15, R. 503) states:

> "Race - We discussed how Timmy would be effected by being reared in a totally white environment. It was brought out that in years past when sufficient black homes have not been available, some children considered legally black have been placed for adoption with white families. However, a great deal of opposition resulted from the black community and social work organizations who felt that a black child reared in a white environment would not be adequately prepared for his life experiences.
>
> At present, Timmy is so young that it is doubtful he is aware of his mixed heritage. However, after discussion the staff was convinced that if we left

him in his present environment we would be giving him problems he would not have if placed in a black home.

A vote was taken and it was a group decision that it would not be in Timmy's best interest to leave him in the Drummond home, and that we would begin immediately to look for an appropriate black adoptive home. Although this was a difficult decision it was felt that Timmy's long range best interest must be the focus." Ex. 15.

Apparently other factors were discussed at the staffing, e.g., age (Georgia law has no limitation but agency policy does; Mr. Drummond met those requirements and had he been single he would have qualified); health (some case workers presented Timmy's pediatrician's views of Mrs. Drummond's health; she had never been asked to verify her good health and had no idea it was under consideration); the community in which they lived (the Drummonds bought a new house in suburban Atlanta so as to have the room required by the agency; they were never told Douglas County was an "unacceptable" community and had no knowledge thereof until this case; the case worker from Douglas County who characterized the community in which they lived had never visited their home or community).

When respondents sought to remove the child from the Drummonds' home, the Drummonds sought a hearing before the state agency and were denied that forum. Because there was no hearing, the Drummonds did not learn of these adverse considerations and of course had no opportunity to refute them. They then instituted an action in federal district court for the northern district of Georgia. A temporary restraining order was issued and nine days later, at the hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court advanced the trial of the merits to that hearing and the complaint was dismissed at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case. This decision is reported in Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family and Childrens Services, 408 F.Supp. 382 (N.D.Ga. 1976)[2]

Following the dismissal of the complaint by the federal court, the Drummonds filed this litigation in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia. The complaint alleged the refusal of defendants to hold a hearing

---

[2] The district court denied a stay pending appeal and the court of appeals after an interim stay denied that motion on appeal. Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family and Childrens Services, 532 F.2d 1001, (5th Cir. 1976). The appeal continues its course. Oral argument was held on November 4, 1976, and is awaiting decision.

on the decision to remove Timmy from their home was an unconstitutional denial of due process in paragraphs 1 and 11 of the complaint, as amended. The denial of equal protection of the laws was alleged in paragraphs 1 and 8 of the complaint, as amended. The equal protection issues were set forth at pages 34-39 of appellants brief. The due process issues as to petitioners and the child are discussed at pages 23-34 of appellants brief in the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Superior Court granted a temporary restraining order and later dismissed the complaint at the conclusion of plaintiffs' case. The Superior Court found that the foster parents had no rights granted under the laws of Georgia to custody of a foster child or to adopt said child; that the Drummonds had not acquired statutorily required consent of the legal custodian of the child, i.e. the state agency, and that their petition to adopt the child was fatally defective for that reason, that plaintiffs had not proved that defendants acted capriciously, arbitrarily and in abuse of their discretion in withholding their consent for the Drummonds to adopt the child; that the defendants used no impermissible standards in consideration of the plaintiffs' request to adopt the child; and that there was no denial of due process of law or equal protection of law nor

of any other rights guaranteed to plaintiffs or the child under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Georgia. 14-A - 16-A. The Superior Court did grant a stay restraining the defendants from proceeding with final adoption of the child. 32-A. The stay was continued pending tne disposition of this petition by the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia on October 1, 1976.

The Supreme Court of the State of Georgia affirmed the superior court holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing either to challenge the removal of the child from their home or the decision not to place the child with the Drummonds for adoption. The court held that the Drummonds had no rights under state law save the right to petition for adoption of a child. And under state law the Drummonds claim of any state rights by virtue of their status as foster parents was without merit.

> The trial court did not err, as alleged in Enumeration 3, in denying any legal rights to foster parents who have cared for a child for more than two years and are his psychological parents. 4-A.

The court ruled that the superior court was correct in holding that there was

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

no denial of due process or equal protection under the fourteenth amendment because it had ruled that foster parents had no right to contest the agency's actions. 4-A. Concluding that property interests are defined by state law the Drummonds had no standing because "the agency's discretion as to which adoptive family will be chosen is absolute and the Drummonds have no rights beyond being considered." 5-A. The court tied its findings of lack of a property interest, lack of an expectation that they would be allowed to adopt the child and lack of any other right into the reason for the court's denial of the equal protection claim.

> We, thus, find no basis for due process protections in favor of the Drummonds, and the equal protection arguments must also fail for the same reasons. 6-A.

The court also decided the child[1] could not challenge the agency's action.

---

[1] Petitioner's complaint in prayer (c) asked for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the child. A separate motion was filed again requesting appointment of a guardian ad litem. The trial court orally ruled that no guardian was necessary because the court and the defendants could adequately represent the interests of Timmy. The Supreme Court of Georgia summarily denied this enumeration of error. 10-A.

We also find no merit in Enumeration 8 claiming that the trial court erred in not holding that Timmy's constitutional rights were infringed since Timmy has no right under the adoption statutes to chose his adoptive parents or consent to his adoption until the age of 14. Code Ann. §74-403. Furthermore, he was not a party to this lawsuit. 6A-7A.

The court also rejected the claim that the agency had arbitrarily withheld consent for the Drummonds to adopt the child. Under state law that entity having legal custody of a child must consent to any petition for adoption or the petition will be denied.

> The FCDFCS as legal guardian of Timmy stands in loco parentis and has all the legal rights of a natural parent, including the benefit of a prima facie right to custody. [citation of authorities omitted.] As is clear from Code Ann. §74-403, the agency also has the right to chose the adoptive parents of its wards by giving or refusing its consent to adopt....

> The Drummonds claim, however, that the consent of the FCDFCS was withheld unreasonably, was "arbitrary" and was "clearly an 'unwarranted exercise of discretion'." Since we have already held that the Drummonds have no right or standing to challenge the agency's action, the trial court properly dismissed this claim. 10A.

The majority opinion includes no recitation that the denial of equal protection was based on the Drummonds' claim that race was impermissibly considered in the agency's decision. A separate opinion by Justice Hill, concurring specially, stated that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the denial of equal protection based on considerations of race under this Court's decision in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Justice Hill would have affirmed the decision on other grounds. 11A-12A. Justice Jordan dissented, believing that once the state places the child in a foster home that this was tacit approval to such parents to be eligible as adoptive parents. Justice Jordan stated that once this relationship was shown to exist the burden would be on the agency to demonstrate changed conditions justifying the removal of the child. He believed that the Drummonds had shown the existence of a concept of

"psychological parents" and that this status should place upon the state the burden of changing the child's status.

> Here the record shows that the FCDFCS had approved the Drummonds as fit and proper foster parents for the care and protection of this child. This love, care and protection lasted some two and one-half years without complaint by the agency. During this period of time the foster parents became the psychological parents of the child, the only parents he had ever known. Upon their application to adopt, permission by the agency should have been given in the absence of a showing that they were no longer fit or eligible to become the adoptive parents. 13A.

Justice Jordan concluded that the foster parents had clearly established an interest in the child sufficient to entitle them to a judicial determination of their rights to adopt. Ibid.

Petitioners would also assert that Timmy had an interest in the relationship entitled to protection. The child had never known any other parents, to him his foster parents were "mommy and daddy." This relationship should not have been terminated because of agency views that he would be better

off in a black home and it should not have been terminated without full due process protection of hearings, representation, presentation of expert evidence, etcetera.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. Important Similar Issues Involving Due Process Rights Of Foster Children And Foster Parents Are Already Pending Before The Court.

Certiorari should be granted because this petition presents a question that is identical with, or similar to, issues pending before this Court in three other cases in which review has been granted, Rodriquez v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, No. 76-5193, __ U.S. __, 45 U.S.L.W. 3320 (October 26, 1976); Shapiro v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, No. 76-183; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, No. 76-180, __ U.S. __, 45 U.S.L.W. 3272, (October 12, 1976). These cases involve due process rights of children placed in foster homes not to be separated from their foster parents without due process.

Decisions of this Court, including Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), holding that the fourteenth amendment protects life, liberty, and property interests from deprivation by the state without due process,

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (196 1972), concluding that a justified expectation may give rise to an implied contract which may not be terminated without due process, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), recognizing a right to family privacy, and the grant of review in Rodriquez, Shapiro and Smith, demonstrate the fundamental importance of the issue of due process rights of foster parents and foster-adoptive children presented in this petition.

While the underlying due process issues in Rodriquez, Shapiro and Smith and this case are similar, this case differs in that it presents the additional issue of whether it is permissible for the state to terminate foster parent care and deny its consent for adoption because of the race of the foster parents. Stated another way, the issue is whether the state may apply a racial presumption by deciding that Timmy, a child whose mother is Caucasian and father is believed to be black, should be adopted by a "black family to grow up in the black community"[1]

---

[1] The staffing report refers to "legally black" children. This term arises out of Ga. Code §§79-103 and 53-312. Appended hereto at page 33A.

Petitioners asserted deprivation of their equal protection rights on the ground that they were not permitted to adopt Timmy because they are white; the decision to place Timmy in a black home necessarily excluded the Drummonds and all other white persons because of their race. The decision denied Timmy of equal protection of the laws in that he was made eligible for adoption only by black families.

II. Where Petitioners Alleged That Race Was Used As An Impermissible Factor In The Respondents' Decision To Remove The Child From The Drummonds' Home And Place Him Elsewhere For Adoption The Court Below Erred In Ruling That There Was No Standing To Raise The Denial Of Equal Protection Claim. This Holding Is In Clear Conflict With Prior Decisions Of This Court.

Quite apart from any rights of life, liberty or property protected by state law, petitioners asserted a right under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment not to be discriminated against on the basis of race. The Supreme Court of Georgia essentially ignored the equal protection claim. After

reciting its reasons for holding that petitioners had no due process rights, it merely concluded that "the equal protection arguments must also fail for the same reasons. 6A.

This Court's decisions leave no room for the proposition that a state agency may discriminate on the basis of race provided that its actions do not infringe any other right of an individual. Even Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), while reversing on the grounds that Roth had no due process rights, explicitly acknowledged that the state could not take rights which infringe his first amendment rights. Similarly, Bishop v. Wood, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2074 (1976), limited its holding to cases in which there was no claim that the public employer's action was motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of a constitutional right.

III. Where Petitioners Assert That Their De Facto Custody Of Timmy Has Resulted In A Psychological Parent-Child Relationship, Such Custody Should Not Arbitrarily And Capriciously Be Changed; Such A Fundamental Relationship Should Not Be Terminated Without Due Process of Law Being Afforded To Both The Foster Child And The Foster Parents.

The concept of psychological parent-child relationships has received acceptance and is the subject of substantial advocacy by psychiatrists and child psychiatrists. The leading work in this area is Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child.[1]

The model custody act approved in 1963 by the American Bar Association, Family Law Section, provides is part as follows:

> Any person who has had de facto custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and proper person shall prima facie be entitled to an award of custody.

---

[1] Testimony at trial elaborated extensively on this concept; witnesses were Elizabeth King, Ph.D., (child psychologist)(T. 234-45) and Jonas Robitscher, M.D., J.D. (psychiatrist-attorney)(T. 72-78).

State Courts are beginning to follow the medical profession in adoption of the psychological parent concept. See Katzoff v. Superior Court, 2 F.L.R. 2232 (Cal.Ct.App. Feb. 1976); In re: B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679 (1974); In re: Confessora B., 348 N.Y.S. 2d 21 (1973).

When a state creates a situation which alters the lives of human beings, which encourages independent relations between a tiny infant and his foster parents over a period of time exceeding two and one-half years, and which leads to potential lasting emotional trauma to the individuals involved when that relationship is to be terminated, the contention that the young foster child and/or the foster parents have no standing to contest removal or no right to due process becomes a glaring inhumane constitutional deprivation. The psychological parent concept should be given recognition by this Court.

CONCLUSION

Petitioners, Robert George Drummond and Mildred Pauline Drummond, pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia entered on September 7, 1976.

MARGIE PITTS HAMES
794 Juniper Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Findings of Fact to be Entered of The Record and Petition For Writ of Certiorari To The Supreme Court of Georgia has been served upon counsel of record by depositing same in the United States Mails, postage prepaid.

MARGIE PITTS HAMES
794 Juniper Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
Tele: (404) 873 - 6565

31316. DRUMMOND et al. v. FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY & CHILDREN SERVICES et al.

UNDERCOFLER, Presiding Justice.

Timmy is a two and a half year old boy, who has been the foster child of the plaintiffs, the Drummonds, since he was one month old. He was placed in their home by the Fulton County Department of Family & Children Services (FCDFCS) after it received temporary custody by court order because the natural mother was unfit. In September, 1975, the natural mother's rights were terminated, legal custody was placed in FCDFCS, and Timmy became eligible for adoption. After their application was denied by the agency, the Drummonds filed this suit to enjoin Timmy's removal from their home and to force the FCDFCS to allow them to adopt Timmy. After the Drummonds' evidence was presented at the hearing on the interlocutory injunction, the FCDFCS moved to dismiss the complaint, and the motion was granted. The Drummonds appeal. We affirm.

1. The Drummonds' complaint seeking injunctive relief to prevent Timmy's removal was dismissed by the trial court as a matter of law. Enumerations 3, 6, 7, and 8 raise the question whether foster parents have any rights vis-a-vis their foster child, and thus standing to protest agency action on behalf of the child and to raise Fourteenth Amendment protections.

The Drummonds first argue that Code Ann. § 74-402, which states that "[a]ny adult person may petition for leave to adopt," supports their claim of standing to contest the agency's action. Although the Drummonds may have standing to bring an adoption petition in the sense that they are legally eligible to apply to the agency, they have no standing to contest the legal custodian's absolute discretion whether to give the consent requisite to a successful petition for adoption. See Division 5 of this opinion, infra. The contention that any such rights are conferred by this Code section is without merit.[1] We find *Duncan v. Harden*, 234 Ga. 204 (214 SE2d 890) (1975) inapposite as it deals with the revocation of consent by the natural parents. The mere statement of fact that the adoptive parents already chosen by the agency did not intervene in no way implies that all potential adoptive parents have any rights.

The Drummonds next urge that any application of the "best interests of the child" rule necessarily implies some de facto rights arising from the psychological dependency of a parent-child relationship which has been sustained over a period of time. Plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified to the trauma of separating a young child such as Timmy from the only parents he has ever known at an age when the separation could not adequately be understood or explained to him. See Alternatives to Parental Right in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L. J. 15 (1963).

The best interest of the child test has been adopted in many jurisdictions. E.g., In re B. G., 11 Cal. 3d 679 (523 P2d 244) (1974); In re Confessora B., 348 N. Y. S. 2d 21 (1973); Halstead v. Halstead, 144 NW2d 861 (Iowa, 1966) (and cits.); Cummins v. Bird, 19 SW2d 959 (Ky., 1929). This rule contemplates a presumption that the best

---

[1]Nor do we find any merit to the argument that Code Ann. § 24A-2001, providing for appointment of counsel where children not represented by a custodian are brought before a juvenile court in delinquency, unruliness or deprivation proceedings, implies that foster parents may have certain rights.

interests of the child lie with the natural parent, but that this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In re Confessora B., supra.

The Georgia law, however, has not followed this pattern. The best interests of the child test is used only between parents who both have equal right to the child. Code Ann. § 74-107; *Knox v. Knox*, 226 Ga. 619 (176 SE2d 712) (1970). Where the dispute is between a natural parent and a third party, on the other hand, the court must award the custody of the child to the parent unless he has lost his parental prerogatives under Code Ann. § 74-108 or is unfit. *Edwards v. Cason*, 237 Ga. 116; *White v. Bryan*, 236 Ga. 349 (223 SE2d 710) (1976); *Knox v. Knox*, supra; *Perkins v. Courson*, 219 Ga. 611 (135 SE2d 388) (1964). See generally Stubbs, A Summary of the Georgia Law of Children, Ch. 7 (1969).

The Drummonds (and amici, The Concerned Foster Parents of Metro Atlanta and Foster Parents in Action) misconstrue the Georgia law in assuming that the best interests of the child rule applies to foster parents. Without this test and its focus on the child, there is no basis for recognizing any right in the "psychological parents." Since the focus in determining whether a third party is entitled to custody is on the natural parents and whether or not they have forfeited their rights or are unfit (Code Ann. § 74-107; *Perkins v. Courson*, supra), any relationship between the child and his foster parents is primarily irrelevant. *Stuckey v. Jones*, 212 Ga. 495 (93 SE2d 719) (1956); *Watkins v. Terrell*, 196 Ga. 651 (27 SE2d 329) (1943).

In *Carson v. Marette*, 217 Ga. 614 (124 SE2d 74) (1962), in a similar situation where a foster parent sought to adopt a child whose legal custody had been placed in the juvenile court by written consent of the mother, the court placed the child in the plaintiff's foster home intending to allow the plaintiff to adopt it. When a neighbor complained that the plaintiff was treating the child cruelly, the juvenile court took the child back and placed it with the state agency. Plaintiff's habeas corpus petition was dismissed because she had no claim to the child. "The only custody that petitioner, Mrs. Carson, ever had of the child was that of custodial care under the order of the court

which could be revoked at any time." 217 Ga. at 615. We see no reason why the result should not be the same where the court has placed the legal custody in a state agency which also pays foster parents for the child's custodial care.

We thus find no merit in the Drummonds' claim of right by virtue of their status as Timmy's foster parents. The trial court did not err, as alleged in Enumeration 3, in denying any legal rights to foster parents who have cared for a child for more than two years and are his psychological parents.

Enumeration of error 7 urging that the trial court erred in holding that the Drummonds were not denied due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment must also fall under our holding that foster parents have no right to adopt a foster child and thus no right to contest the agency's withholding of consent. The Fourteenth Amendment protects life, liberty and property interests from undue interference by the state.[2] Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972). "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." 408 U. S. at 577. The Drummonds allege several theories under which they claim entitlement to Fourteenth Amendment protections. We, however, find no merit to their contentions, and thus no standing to demand due process or equal protection of the laws.

The Drummonds' first argument that the right to adopt a child under Code Ann. § 74-402,[3] is a "protectable

---

[2]The Fourteenth Amendment in pertinent part provides: "... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

[3]The only statutory requirements for adoption are that the person be at least twenty-five years old or married and living with his spouse, at least ten years older than the child, a resident of the state, and

interest" under the Fourteenth Amendment has already been considered and rejected above. They in fact were given the right to apply, they were interviewed and the application denied. As we have already noted, the agency's discretion as to which adoptive family will be chosen is absolute and the Drummonds have no rights beyond being considered. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that property interests are defined by state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra. The law of Georgia very clearly provides no rights in foster parents to adopt.

For the same reason, the Drummonds can not base their due process claim on a "right of family privacy." Since they have no right to keep Timmy, they can have no expectation of family privacy. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972) and other cases cited by the Drummonds are inapposite as the court in those cases was dealing with the rights of the biological parents.

The Drummonds next claim that the refusal by the adoption agency to allow them to adopt Timmy was based on erroneous information which they had no opportunity to contradict or correct and entitles them to due process. However, where there is no property interest to be protected, the Fourteenth Amendment does not "guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised [agency] decisions." Bishop v. Wood, — U. S. — (96 SC 2074, 48 LE2d 684, 693) (1976).

Nor do we find merit in the Drummonds' claim that they had a "justified expectation" or "implied contract" to adopt Timmy. See Board of Regents v. Roth, supra; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972); Sims v. Fox, 505 F2d 857 (5th Cir., 1974).

The Drummonds' allegation that the agency's refusal to allow them to adopt Timmy constitutes "a governmental attack on one's 'good name, reputation, honor, and community standing' " (Sims v. Fox, supra, p.

---

financially able and morally fit to have the child. Code Ann. § 74-402. Of course, Code Ann. § 74-403 provides the conditions under which a child becomes available for adoption.

862; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971)), and thus imposes due process obligations on the agency, is also without merit. Since the agency did not disclose this decision publicly, but merely communicated its decision orally at a meeting with the Drummonds, it cannot form the basis of a claim that the Drummonds' reputation in the community was impaired. Any other publicity "made in the course of a judicial proceeding which did not commence until after petitioner[s] had suffered the injury for which [they seek] redress . . . surely cannot provide retroactive support for [their] claim." Bishop v. Wood, supra, p. 692; Sims v. Fox, supra.

We thus find no basis for due process protections in favor of the Drummonds, and the equal protection arguments must also fail for the same reasons.

We decline to rule on the FCDFCS's assertions that res judicata and collateral estoppel bar relitigation of these constitutional issues. These claims arise from the fact that the Drummonds first brought a similar action against the FCDFCS in federal district court under 28 USC § 1983. When relief was denied there, the Drummonds instituted this suit in the Fulton County Superior Court. The FCDFCS has properly pleaded these affirmative defenses (Code Ann. § 81A-108 (c)); however, they must be properly proved by placing the entire certified record of the previous case in evidence. *Carr v. Car-Perk Services, Inc.*, 222 Ga. 793 (152 SE2d 692) (1966); *Smith v. Bank of Acworth*, 220 Ga. 626 (140 SE2d 889) (1965); *Glaze v. Bogle*, 105 Ga. 295 (31 SE 169) (1898). Since the Drummonds' case was dismissed before the FCDFCS had an opportunity to present its case, the certified record was not put in evidence, is not part of this record, was not considered by the trial court, and will not be considered here.

In conclusion, we hold that the Drummonds have no rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and thus no standing to contest the agency's action in refusing to consent to their adoption of Timmy. Their request for an injunction was correctly dismissed.

2. We also find no merit in Enumeration 8 claiming that the trial court erred in not holding that Timmy's constitutional rights were infringed since Timmy has no

right under the adoption statutes to choose his adoptive parents or consent to his adoption until the age of fourteen. Code Ann. § 74-403. Furthermore, he was not a party to this lawsuit.

3. In enumeration of error 14, the Drummonds claim a denial of due process by the FCDFCS because of its refusal to afford them a hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act, Code Ann. Ch. 3A-1. Code Ann. § 3A-114 provides that "In addition to any other requirements imposed by common law, Constitution, statutes or regulations: (1) In any *contested case,* all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice served personally or by mail." (Emphasis supplied.) The definition of "contested case" is contained in Code Ann. § 3A-102 (b): " 'Contested case' means a proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are *required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.*" (Emphasis supplied.)

We have already reviewed in essence in Division 1, supra, the common law, Constitution, and statutes in order to determine if any rights accrued to the Drummonds by virtue of their status as Timmy's foster parents, and have found none. It is also clear from the record that the FCDFCS rules and regulations also do not afford any right in the foster parents to adopt a foster child in their care. The normal policy, which was not carried out in this case, is to ask potential foster parents to sign a statement acknowledging that the child will not be available for adoption by them. Foster parents are, however, eligible to apply to adopt foster children, in exceptional cases.[4] County Letter No. 323, State Department of Family and Children Services (Oct. 15, 1971). It thus appears that the agency, rather than recognizing any priority in foster parents as potential adoptive homes, discourages such adoptions.

---

[4]"Foster boarding applicants are oriented from the beginning of the home study in a different way from adoptive applicants. The foster care plan is geared toward the temporary instead of the permanent. The home is not selected for the child with the idea that it will be a permanent home. Indeed, for most of the children in foster

Once, however, the foster parents and others have made known their wish to adopt a child, the agency is free to choose any or none of the applicants, according to its own policies. There is no opportunity for a hearing. Although each potential adoptive couple is interviewed, this functions as a fact finding mechanism rather than as an adversary proceeding or "hearing" in which evidence is presented. We, therefore, reiterate that the decision to choose adoptive parents for children in the custody of the FCDFCS is entirely discretionary in nature, the same as it would be for the natural parents in whose place the agency stands. Since there is thus no "contested case" within the meaning of the APA, the trial court did not err in failing to rule that such a procedure was necessary.

4. The Drummonds' enumeration of error four raises the question whether the trial court erred in dismissing their petition for adoption as fatally defective on the ground that the FCDFCS had not consented to the adoption. They allege that the consent was unreasonably withheld, thus unnecessary, and their petition should not have been dismissed.

Although the FCDFCS had only temporary custody

---

care, adoption will not be the ultimate plan. The foster parent may be older than adoptive parents would ideally be or may have health problems which do not rule them out as temporary foster parents but would cause adoption to seem questionable. Foster parents are asked to sign a statement when they accept a child to the effect that this child is not available for adoption by them.

"For the above and other reasons, the development of a foster home into an adoptive home for a foster child in that home must definitely be considered an exception. However, this plan should not be overlooked as a possibility for certain children nor should it be considered an inferior plan. The foster home as an adoptive home is generally considered a resource for older children who have formed meaningful relationships with the foster family or for children with health problems or handicaps which the foster parents understand, accept and handle satisfactorily." County Letter No. 323, State DFCS (Oct. 15, 1971).

of Timmy when he was removed from his natural mother and placed with the Drummonds at one month old, the Department obtained his legal custody on September 25, 1975, when the natural mother's parental rights were terminated.[5] Only then was Timmy eligible for adoption. Code Ann. § 74-403 requires the consent of the agency before a child placed in its legal custody may be adopted.[6] Code Ann. § 24A-3204 (a), which provides for the placing of children with an agency upon termination of parental rights, also mandates that consent of the agency is necessary for adoption.[7]

---

[5]"It is further ordered that legal custody of the said [Timmy] be placed with the Georgia Department of Human Resources, Division of Family & Children Services, and the said agency is granted the right to proceed with the adoption of said child. . ." Order, Fulton County Juvenile Court, September 25, 1975.

[6]§ 74-403. Consent of living parents or guardian. . . .

(1) Except as otherwise specified in the following subsections, no adoption shall be permitted except with the written consent of the living parents of a child . . .

(2) Exemption where child abandoned or parental custody terminated. . .

(4) Guardian.—If the child has a guardian of its person, the consent of such guardian shall be required, or if the child has been surrendered or *committed by court order to a licensed child-placing agency, the consent of such agency shall be required.*

[7]§ 24A-3204. Commitment to agency.

(a) If, upon entering an order terminating the parental rights of a parent, there is no parent having parental rights, the court shall commit the child to the custody of the Division of Children and Youth or a licensed child-placing agency, willing to accept custody for the purpose of placing the child for adoption, or in the absence thereof in a foster home or take other suitable measures for the care and welfare of the child. The custodian has authority to consent to the adoption of the child, his marriage, his enlistment in the armed forces of the United States and surgical and other medical treatment for the child.

The FCDFCS as legal custodian of Timmy stands in loco parentis and has all the legal rights of a natural parent, including the benefit of the prima facie right to custody. See *Porter v. Watkins*, 217 Ga. 73 (121 SE2d 120) (1961); *Parker v. Thomas County Dept. of Public Welfare*, 214 Ga. 701 (107 SE2d 178) (1959). As is clear from Code Ann. § 74-403, the agency also has the right to choose the adoptive parents of its wards by giving or refusing its consent to adopt.[8] Since the Drummonds did not have, nor claim to have this consent, the adoption petition was fatally defective, and subject to dismissal.

The Drummonds claim, however, that the consent of the FCDFCS was withheld unreasonably, was "arbitrary" and was "clearly an 'unwarranted exercise of discretion'." Since we have already held that the Drummonds have no right or standing to challenge the agency's action, the trial court properly dismissed this claim.

5. Enumerations of error 1, 2, 5, 9 and 12 need not be considered as they relate to procedural or evidentiary aspects of the case which are irrelevant since we here affirm the dismissal of the case as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for relief. We also hold that the trial court did not err in denying the Drummonds' motions for supersedeas, for new trial, or for reconsideration.

Both parties' motions to strike are denied.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hill, J., who concurs specially, and Jordan, J., who dissents.

ARGUED JULY 13, 1976 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 7, 1976.

Adoption, etc.; constitutional question. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Holt.

Margie Pitts Hames, Mary Ann Oakley, Barbara J. Bethune, for appellants.

Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Daniel

---

[8]The Drummonds' reading of the statute whereby the agency's consent would not be required clearly misconstrues its language. See n. 7, supra.

S. Reinhardt, Robert L. Mote, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Lois Oakley, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Lawrence L. Schneider, amicus curiae.

HILL, Justice, concurring specially.

Although I concur in the judgment of the court, I am unable to agree that because plaintiffs have not been denied life, liberty or property, they lack standing to urge equal protection arguments. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part as follows: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Standing to assert a denial of equal protection does not require a deprivation of life, liberty or property, but requires only the denial to a person by the state of the equal protection of the law, which denial affects the person asserting the claim personally and differently from others similarly situated. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (92 SC 1965, 32 LE2d 627) (1972), a guest was refused service in the dining room and bar of a private club licensed by the state to sell liquor. Although the state's licensing was found not to be sufficient state action to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the guest had standing to litigate the equal protection claim. The court did not predicate standing to make the equal protection argument on a deprivation of life, liberty or property.

The plaintiffs contend that the state considered race in its decision not to permit plaintiffs' adoption of Timmy. The Fulton County Department of Family & Children Services presented evidence that other factors such as age, health and psychology were considered. However, this issue had been adjudicated between these same parties in the United States District Court, where it was found that consideration of race, to the extent it contributed to the decision, was only such legitimate consideration as was necessarily required in determining the proper placement of Timmy, and was not a part of an automatic placement policy based solely on race. The plaintiffs' complaint in federal court was dismissed.

Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family & Children Services, 408 FSupp. 382 (N. D. Ga. Jan. 30, 1976).

The court below had before it a certified copy of the district court's decision. The decision itself, even without the record, is sufficient to show the issue decided. See Pye v. Department of Transportation of State of Ga., 513 F2d 290 (5th Cir. 1975). Cf. *Ferguson v. Caldwell,* 233 Ga. 887 (213 SE2d 855) (1975). Although the district court did not decide the state law questions, it did decide this Fourteenth Amendment issue. The district court had jurisdiction to decide that issue. Because the judgment of that court has not been reversed or set aside, that judgment is conclusive as between the parties here. Code Ann. § 110-501. Therefore, the court below committed no error in dismissing plaintiff's claim of denial of equal protection of the laws.

JORDAN, Justice, dissenting.

I do not agree with the holding in the majority opinion that the "relationship between the child and his foster parents is primarily irrelevant" and the conclusion that "we thus find no merit in the Drummonds' claim of right by virtue of their status as Timmy's foster parents."

The facts in *Carson v. Marette,* 217 Ga. 614 (124 SE2d 74) (1962), cited in the majority opinion, which denied the claim of the foster parent, are vastly different from the facts in this case. In *Carson* the custody of the foster parent had been revoked by the juvenile court based on a complaint filed in that court alleging abuse and mistreatment of the child by the foster parent. Certainly this was sufficient to eliminate any legal claim or right the foster parent might have had. In the case under consideration the facts show love and care for the child and no court has ever revoked the custodial care given to the foster parents at the time the child was placed in their home.

It is my position that when a state agency having only legal custodial status places a child in a foster home, tacit approval is given that such foster parents are eligible to be adoptive parents. Once this relationship is shown to exist the burden should be upon the agency to

show that conditions have changed adversely affecting the welfare of the child, such as was done in *Carson,* supra. Unless such changed conditions are shown to exist, the agency no longer has the absolute and arbitrary discretion to refuse such application to adopt.

Here the record shows that the FCDFCS had approved the Drummonds as fit and proper foster parents for the care and protection of this child. This love, care and protection lasted some 2-1/2 years without complaint by the agency. During this period of time the foster parents became the psychological parents of the child, the only parents he had ever known. Upon their application to adopt, permission by the agency should have been given in the absence of a showing that they were no longer fit or eligible to become the adoptive parents.

This is not a dispute between the natural parent(s) of a child and some third party, as was the situation in several cases cited by the majority. This dispute is between foster parents who in time have become psychological parents and a state agency whose only interest should be that the "best interest of the child" test has been met. The initial determination of this test was made by the agency when it placed custodial care of the child in the Drummonds at the age of one month. This "best interest of the child" determination is presumed to continue until the contrary appears. This record is devoid of facts to show such a change. The Drummonds' application to adopt was simply "denied."

Georgia should follow the lead of several states which have recognized that legal rights can attach to foster parents under certain conditions. See In re Confessora B., 348 N. Y. S. 2d 21 (1973). Under the facts of this case the foster parents had clearly established an interest in the child sufficient to entitle them to a judicial determination of their right to adopt.

In my opinion the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.

I respectfully dissent.

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF FULTON
STATE OF GEORGIA

ROBERT GRACE DRUMMOND and MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES; DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

FILE NO. C-14669

FINDINGS OF FACT TO BE ENTERED OF RECORD

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Court finds that defendant Department of Human Resources of the State of Georgia, Division of Family and Children's Services is the legal custodian of said child by virtue of an order of Fulton County Juvenile Court, dated September 25, 1975, with the right to proceed with the adoption of said child.

The Court finds further that by the same order of the said court, temporary custody of said child was vested in the defendant Fulton County Department of Family and Children's Services pending placement for adoption by the Department of Human Resources of the State of Georgia, Division of Family and Children's Services.

The Court finds that foster parents under the laws of Georgia have no rights independently granted by law, either to custody of a foster child or to adopt a foster child placed in their foster care.

The Court finds that plaintiffs have not acquired and do not have the statutorily required consent of the legal custodian to proceed with the adoption of said child; the petition for adoption as set up by amendment to the original complaint is fatally defective and must be dismissed as failing to set forth a cause upon which the relief sought may be granted.

The Court further finds that the plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to show that defendants have acted capriciously, arbitrarily and in abuse of their discretion in refusing consent to the adoption of said child by plaintiffs. The defendants acted reasonably in the exercise of such discretion.

The Court further finds that the defendants used no impermissible standards in consideration of the plaintiffs' request to adopt said child, nor in arriving at its decision to deny such request.

The Court further finds no denial of due process of law and no denial of equal protection of law nor of any other rights guaranteed to plaintiffs or the child under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Georgia.

O R D E R

IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the relief sought by plaintiffs in their complaint, as amended, be and the same hereby is denied, and the said complaint, as amended, be and the same hereby is dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the said child (Timothy Lee Hill) be and he hereby is remanded to the custody of the defendants for the purpose of the execution of the aforesaid Order of the Juvenile Court of Fulton County, dated September 25, 1975.

This March 19, 1976.

/s/ Elbert Hill

JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

ROBERT GRACE DRUMMOND and MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	CIVIL ACTION
vs.	)	FILE NO. C-14669
FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, et al.,	)	
Defendants.	)	

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

On November 16, 1973, a male baby was born to a white mother. The race of the father at the time was unknown. The child has been called Timmy.

2.

In early December of 1973, the defendants, Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services and the Department of Human Resources of the State of Georgia, Division of Family and Children Services, took custody of Timmy pursuant to appropriate legal procedure. Custody was taken because it was believed that the mother at that time was unable to provide adequate care for the child.

3.

On December 14, 1973, Timmy was placed in foster care with the plaintiffs in this action, Robert and Pauline Drummond.

4.

The Drummonds had been approved as a foster care family for infants under the auspices of the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services; there had been one placement in the Drummond home prior to Timmy. The previous foster child was in the Drummond home for a period of three months preceding December of 1973.

5.

Foster care is a temporary program in which foster parents accept the possession and care of a child which is in the legal custody of the appropriate state agency and foster parents agree to provide a temporary living arrangement for that child, with subsidies to be provided by the State. Foster families are given no rights with regard to foster children placed in their care.

6.

The temporary nature of foster care was explained to the Drummonds at the time they applied to be foster parents.

7.

The foster child Timmy stayed with the Drummonds from December 14, 1973, and was still with the Drummonds at the time of this hearing.

8.

Apparently, the Drummonds intermittently expressed interest in adopting Timmy if he were free for adoption.

9.

In response to these intermittent requests, the Drummonds were told, as they had been previously, that there was an age policy which was an important factor in considering their request to adopt Timmy, but that they would be eligible to adopt a child from five to nine years of age. Also, at least until September of 1975, the Drummonds were told that since the defendants did not have adoptive rights to Timmy, no decision could be made on adoption.

10.

In March of 1975, the Drummonds had a meeting with representatives of the defendants to discuss continued foster care and possible adoption of Timmy. At that time, it was explained to the Drummonds that adoptive rights had not yet been obtained for Timmy but that when they were, the defendants would probably be looking for adoptive couples other than the Drummonds. The reasons

for that decision were explained to the Drummonds at the time. The Drummonds were asked if they could continue to provide a loving foster home for Timmy and let Timmy go when the time came for adoption. The Drummonds said that they could.

11.

In approximately August of 1975, during a routine annual foster home re-evaluation, Barbara Osgood, a social worker with the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services, was told by the Drummonds that they had renewed their interest in adopting Timmy.

12.

Barbara Osgood reported that request to her superiors who informed Barbara Osgood that the Drummonds' request would be considered.

13.

On September 25, 1975, adoptive rights were obtained on the child, Timmy. On that date, Judge Tom Dillon of the Fulton County Juvenile Court entered an Order terminating the parental rights of Timmy's natural parents and placing permanent legal custody and guardianship of Timmy with the Department of Human Resources of the State of Georgia, Division of Family and Children Services.

14.

On October 4, 1975, the Drummonds were given a formal evaluation interview in connection with their request to adopt Timmy. Brenda Payne interviewed the Drummonds and prepared a lengthy report summarizing that interview.

15.

Also in October of 1975, Kaye Dallinger, of the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services, requested appropriate state authorities to ascertain whether there were any available adoptive applicants to be evaluated for possible placement of Timmy. It should be noted that Brenda Payne, in her interview evaluation report, recommended that the Drummonds be allowed to adopt Timmy, but in making that recommendation stated that she knew of no alternative adoption resource for the child.

16.

On November 21, 1975, approximately 18 agents or employees of the defendants met to formally decide upon the Drummonds' request to adopt Timmy.

17.

The meeting was unusual, both in the large number of people present and in the fact that only the Drummonds' request was being considered at that time. Normally, fewer people are involved and more

than one adoptive applicant is considered. However, it was stated that the defendants wanted to give priority consideration to the Drummonds because they had been foster parents for such a long period of time.

18.

The consensus of the committee on November 21, 1975 was to deny the Drummonds' request. The committee met for over three hours, reviewed all of the records kept on Timmy and the Drummonds since Timmy was placed with the Drummonds, and discussed freely the questions raised. A vote was taken at the end and only one person voted in favor of leaving Timmy with the Drummonds.

19.

Among the reasons on which the decision was based are the following:

(a) Age: Mr. Drummond was 39 and Mrs. Drummond was 51 at the time of consideration of their request. The state and county agencies had policies regarding appropriate ages of adoptive couples. As part of this policy, the defendants opposed placing infants with adoptive couples who were more than 36 years older than the infant. There is a similar age policy on the national level and also among most English-speaking countries.

(b) Health: The Drummonds had once before asked the defendants to remove Timmy from their home on the advice of

their physician and family friend, Dr. George Lucas. Apparently, the Drummonds had visited Dr. Lucas at a time when Mrs. Drummond was fatigued and anxious and Dr. Lucas recommended that she give up the child. Also, the two pediatricians who care for Timmy, Drs. Louis and Virginia Reynaud, had advised the defendants that Timmy was physically too much for Mrs. Drummond to handle. They advised the defendants that Mrs. Drummond fatigued easily and cried frequently during Timmy's visits with the pediatricians. The defendants felt, regardless of whether Mrs. Drummond were suffering from any specific physical disability, that Mrs. Drummond was not capable of coping with the day-to-day rigors of a healthy, active child of Timmy's age, especially as he grows older.

(c) The community in which the Drummonds were living at the time was also considered. The Drummonds were living in a predominantly white community, in a white neighborhood, where the school was white, and only two day care centers in the entire county had signed the Civil Rights Compliance Act. It was believed that Timmy's natural father was black. No definitive evidence was ever elicited on this, but the child appeared to be mixed race at the time of consideration and was generally considered to be such by all involved.

(d) Parenting abilities: The general consensus of those at the meeting was that the Drummonds had given good care to Timmy up until that point but there was a good deal of discussion and concern as to whether the Drummonds would

e able to continue to meet Timmy's needs as he grows older.

(e) Intellectual environment: Timmy was known to be an exceptionally bright child. Mrs. Drummond had completed ninth grade and Mr. Drummond completed high school through GED. It was doubted by the group that the defendants would be able to provide the stimulation and opportunities that Timmy would need in the future.

(f) Race: As was indicated, Timmy was, and is, considered mixed race, black and white. The Drummonds are white. There was evidence that these defendants do place mixed race children with white families. However, the evidence showed that these defendants are very careful in their selection of the appropriate white families with which to place mixed race children, and there are specific desirable characteristics. Generally, it was concluded by the defendants that the Drummonds did not have these characteristics and it was felt that the Drummonds would be unable to cope with Timmy's needs.

(g) Separation: During the hearings on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs presented evidence that separating Timmy from the Drummonds at that point in time could create developmental problems for the child in the long run. This evidence was elicited from a psychologist

and a child psychiatrist. During their November 21, 1975 meeting, defendants weighed the potential problems created by separation against the potential problems created by allowing the plaintiffs to adopt Timmy.

20.

On November 26, 1975, the Drummonds met with agents of the defendants and were informed of the decision not to allow them to adopt Timmy and the basis for that decision.

21.

The defendants acknowledged that the Drummonds loved Timmy and wanted Timmy and that separation may create some problems but concluded that there was sufficient justification for denying the request of the Drummonds.

22.

In the meantime, the defendants had located an alternative adoption resource for Timmy. The plans were to place Timmy with a young, better-educated, professional, black couple.

23.

The Drummonds decided to fight the decision and hired attorneys to assist them in that fight.

24.

After attempts to negotiate and requests for rehearings from the defendants, the Drummonds filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on January 14, 1976, after a request for an administrative hearing had been denied by the defendants, alleging that defendants' actions were discriminatory and a violation of the laws of the State of Georgia and the United States and requesting injunctive relief. After hearing all of plaintiffs' evidence, Judge Charles Moye issued an Order on January 30, 1976 dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and stating that there was no evidence that defendants had unlawfully discriminated against the Drummonds. Judge Moye also held that race was a permissible criterion and was so used by the defendants in their decision not to place Timmy for adoption with the plaintiffs.

25.

On January 23, 1976, plaintiffs filed the instant complaint in the Superior Court of Fulton County and obtained a temporary restraining order from Judge Charles Wofford of the Superior Court of Fulton County restraining the defendants from removing the child Timmy from the plaintiffs' home pending a hearing on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.

26.

By amendment to their complaint, plaintiffs filed an adoption petition for the child, Timmy. Plaintiffs did not allege, nor could they, that they had obtained the consent of defendants to adopt Timmy. Defendants withheld and still withhold such consent.

27.

Prior to the hearing on the preliminary injunction, the defendants answered and filed a Motion for a Preliminary Determination of the Defenses contained in their Answer. This motion was again made to the Court at the start of the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

28.

At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, defendants renewed their Motion for a Preliminary Determination of Defenses and also moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that the complaint did not set forth sufficient grounds upon which the relief sought could be granted.

O R D E R

The within and foregoing Findings of Fact are ordered filed as a part of the record in the above-stated case.

This March 31, 1976.

/s/ Edwin Holt
JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF FULTON
STATE OF GEORGIA

ROBERT GEORGE DRUMMOND and MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND, Plaintiffs,	)	
vs.	)	CIVIL ACTION
FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURSES, OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, Defendants.	)	FILE NO. C-14669

ORDER

Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and for a New Trial having been considered, a hearing having been had, all parties having been heard, and all pleadings directed to the Motion having been reviewed, and it appearing to the Court that the grounds allegedly justifying the Motion to Reconsider and for a New Trial are without merit, it is hereby ordered, judged, and

decreed that plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and for a New Trial is denied on each and every ground thereof.

This 5th day of April, 1976.

/s/ Elmo Holt

JUDGE Elmo Holt
SUPERIOR COURT of
FULTON COUNTY

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF FULTON
STATE OF GEORGIA

ROBERT GRACE DRUMMOND and MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	CIVIL ACTION
vs.	)	FILE NO. C-14669
FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, et al.,	)	
Defendants.	)	

ORDER ON REQUEST FOR
SUPERSEDEAS OR STAY ORDER

The Court having heretofore disposed of plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and For a New Trial and plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance by appropriate orders, and

There now remains to be disposed of plaintiffs' Request for Supersedeas or Stay Order.

All the evidence presented throughout the entire proceeding having been considered in connection herewith, the Court finds that plaintiffs will suffer

no irreparable injury upon the Court's failure to grant a Supersedeas or Stay Order, and

After hearing arguments of counsel and consideration thereof, together with briefs submitted,

IT IS CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff's Request for Supersedeas or Stay Order be and the same hereby is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no adoption of the child named in these proceedings be finalized until the Supreme Court of Georgia renders its judgment on the issues raised in the Notice of Appeal, filed by plaintiffs on April 6, 1976, in order that the rights of the parties, if any, be preserved and protected, provided plaintiffs proceed expeditiously with said appeal without any delay.

This April 7, 1976.

/s/ Ethno Hall
JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

79-103 (2177) Persons of color, who are All Negroes, Mulattoes, mestizos, and their descendants, having any ascertainable trace of either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood in their veins, and all descendants of any person having either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood in his or her veins, shall be known in this State as persons of color.
(Acts 1865-6, p. 239; 1927, p. 272.)

53-312 "White person" defined
The term "white person" shall include only persons of the white or Caucasian race, who have no ascertainable trace of either Negro, African, West Indian, Asiatic Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in their veins. No person, any one of whose ancestors has been duly registered with the State Bureau of Vital Statistics as a colored person or person of color, shall be deemed to be a white person.
(Acts 1927, pp. 272, 277.)

Supreme Court, U. S.
FILED
MAR 15 1977
MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

NO. 76-984

ROBERT GEORGE DRUMMOND and
MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,
Petitioners,

v.

FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ARTHUR K. BOLTON
Attorney General

ROBERT S. STUBBS, II
Executive Asst. Atty. General

DON A. LANGHAM
First Assistant Atty. General

MICHAEL J. BOWERS
Senior Assistant Atty. General

CAROL ATHA COSGROVE
Assistant Attorney General

DANIEL S. REINHARDT
Special Asst. Atty. General

ROBERT L. MOTE
Special Asst. Atty. General

Counsel for Respondents
132 State Judicial Building
Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Please Serve:
CAROL ATHA COSGROVE
Asst. Atty. General
132 State Judicial Bldg.
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
Telephone:
(404) 656-3338

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	ii
INTRODUCTION	1
FEDERAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW	1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	2
REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE WRIT	4
I. Petitioners' state court action has essentially been mooted by the Fifth Circuit's February 2, 1977 decision	4
II. The decision below of the Due Process question is accurate, and based on substantial evidence and a correct reading of this Court's prior decisions	5
III. Whether or not the decision below on the Equal Protection question was correct, Petitioners' argument is without merit	7
CONCLUSION	8
APPENDIX	1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases—Federal:

Aikens v. State of California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972) 5

Bishop v. Wood, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976) 6

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) 5

Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) 7

Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family and Children Services, 408 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1976), *rev'd.* ___ F.2d ___ (5th Cir., Feb. 2, 1977) 4

Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 7

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) 8

OFFER v. Dumpson, ___ F. Supp. ___ (S.D. N.Y.) *probable juris. noted sub. nom. Shapiro v. OFFER*, 45 U.S.L.W. 3272 (Oct. 12, 1976) 6

Paschall v. Stewart, 414 U.S. 100 (1973) 8

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) 6

Rodriquez v. OFFER, No. 76-5193, 45 U.S.L.W. 3320 (Oct. 26, 1976) 6

Shapiro v. OFFER, No. 76-183, 45 U.S.L.W. 3272 (Oct. 12, 1976) 6

Singleton v. Wulff, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976) 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

Page

Cases—Federal (Continued):

Smith v. OFFER, No. 76-180, 45 U.S.L.W. 3272 (Oct. 12, 1976) 6

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 6

Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y., 1974) 7

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) 6

Cases—State:

Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family and Children Services, 237 Ga. 449, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1976) 2

Manry v. Stevens, 190 Ga. 305 (1940) 5

Miller v. Columbus, 229 Ga. 234 (1972) 8

Statutes:

Ga. Code Ann. § 81A-108(c) 8

Ga. Code Ann. § 81A-112(b) 8

Ga. Code Ann. § 81A-156 8

Other Authorities:

45 C.F.R. 205 and 214 7

L. Grow and D. Shapiro, *Black Children, White Parents: Study of Transracial Adoptions* (Research Center, Child Welfare League of America, 1974) 7

6 *Moore's Federal Practice*, ¶ 56.14[1] (2d Ed. 1975) 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1976

NO. 76-984

ROBERT GEORGE DRUMMOND and
MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,
Petitioners,

v.

FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES,
Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

Respondents accept Petitioners' recitation of OPINIONS BELOW and JURISDICTION. However, Respondents wish to present their own understanding of the QUESTIONS PRESENTED and STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

FEDERAL QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether Petitioners, as foster parents, have Due Process rights arising out of their psychological rela-

tionship to their former foster child which entitle them to demand a formal Due Process hearing when they apply to adopt that child and which give them standing to challenge the discretionary custodial decision made by the child's legal guardian to permit another couple to adopt the child.

II. Whether Respondents, the child's legal guardians, are constitutionally prohibited from engaging in individualized considerations of race-related attitudes and factors in considering a white foster parents' application to adopt their mixed-race foster child.

III. Whether Petitioners, as foster parents, have standing to raise alleged constitutional rights of their former foster child, and, if so, whether an infant foster child has a Due Process right to a hearing and representation when his legal guardian makes decisions concerning his custody.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action was commenced by Petitioners to adopt their mixed-race foster child "Timmy" and to restrain Respondents, Timmy's legal guardian, from placing Timmy for adoption with any other couple. Petitioners were approved as foster parents by Respondents, i.e., were selected for their ability to give infants short-term care on an emergency basis. (R. 152) [1] Petitioners' care of Timmy lasted for nearly two years while Respondents first attempted to rehabilitate Timmy's natural mother

[1] Foster parents are not screened or selected on the basis of their ability to meet a child's long-term best interests as his adoptive parents and many people who qualify as foster parents are not normally eligible to be adoptive parents for the same child. *Drummond v. Fulton County Dept. of Family and Children Services, et al.*, 237 Ga. 449, 455, n. 4, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1976). Reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1-A to 13-A (hereinafter "Pet. at ___").

and then brought court action to terminate all parental rights to Timmy. During that two years, Petitioners were repeatedly apprised of the temporary status of their care of Timmy, were discouraged from any interest in adopting Timmy, and were advised that, if they desired, they were eligible to adopt an older child. (T. 24-5, 31, 139, 141)

After Respondents obtained legal rights to Timmy in September of 1975, Petitioners formally applied to adopt Timmy. They were interviewed pursuant to normal procedures and in November of 1975 a group of approximately 18 was convened to review the information obtained in the interviews, to evaluate the extensive foster care record of Petitioners, and to make a decision on Petitioners' application. After a lengthy discussion, the group voted 17:1 to deny the application. (R. 152, ¶¶ 16-18) Among the reasons for the decision were Petitioners' health, age, community environment, intellectual capacity, and attitudes relevant to the child's mixed race. (T. 357-372; R. 152. ¶¶ 19(a)-(g)) As to the latter, it was thought that Petitioners denied Timmy's racial heritage, were racially naive, had not had the proper experiences to best raise a mixed-race child, and that Timmy would be better off in a black home than Petitioners' home. (T. 357-361) (Timmy is now placed with a young, professional mixed-race couple who will adopt him if permitted by the courts.)

After being refused a formal administrative hearing, Petitioners brought an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that their Due Process and Equal Protection rights were violated, and seeking an injunction against removal of Timmy from their home. A temporary injunction was granted and then, after a consolidated final trial on the merits, Petitioners' case was dismissed, Judge Charles

Moye finding that there were no constitutional violations and that considerations of race were permissibly directed to the child's best interest. *Drummonds v. Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services*, 408 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1976). That decision was appealed.

Petitioners then brought the instant case in state superior court alleging the *same* constitutional violations and, in addition, alleging state grounds for relief and seeking adoption of the child. Another restraining order was granted on January 23, 1976, but was dissolved on March 19, 1976, when Petitioners' case was dismissed after a three-day presentation of their evidence. (R. 14) The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal in an opinion which is the subject of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

In the meantime, on February 2, 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down a 2:1 decision, per Tuttle, J., on Petitioners' federal appeal, which decision reversed and remanded to the trial court for the holding of a *de novo* administrative Due Process hearing on Petitioners' adoption application free from arbitrary racial classifications. The mandate was issued simultaneously with the filing of the opinion. (Judge Tuttle's opinion is attached at pages 1a-47a.) Judge Roney's dissent was filed on February 11, 1977 (attached hereto at pages 47a to 56a).

REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE WRIT

I. Petitioners' state court action has essentially been mooted by the Fifth Circuit's February 2, 1977 decision.

The only relief which Petitioners sought on federal constitutional grounds was an injunction restraining any

adoption of Timmy pending a Due Process hearing on their adoption application free from unconstitutionally discriminatory considerations. That relief has been ordered by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and, therefore, this state court action has essentially been mooted. *Cf., Aikens v. State of California*, 406 U.S. 813 (1972).

It is now for Respondents to decide how to proceed from the Fifth Circuit's decision. At any event, Petitioners have their relief and cannot be prejudiced by denial of their application here. Moreover, the Due Process question the Petitioners describe as being of "substantial importance" is already before this Court and thus can be considered by this Court without the necessity of granting certiorari in this case. (Pet. at 14) Finally, it may be more efficacious to consider the federal questions raised by the underlying facts in the context of the companion federal case which is not clouded by state law issues or possible independent state court grounds (*e.g., res judicata, Manry v. Stevens*, 190 Ga. 305 (1940)).

II. The decision below of the Due Process question is accurate, and based on substantial evidence and a correct reading of this Court's prior decisions.

The Due Process question is whether these foster parents had a protectable interest under *Board of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), implicated by Respondents' decision on their adoption application such that they were entitled to a full Due Process hearing in connection with that decision.[2] The Court below correctly concluded that, as a

[2] Contrary to Petitioners' suggestion (Pet. at 3, ¶¶ IV, V), Timmy's Due Process rights are not involved here. The Georgia Supreme Court correctly excluded Timmy's rights from the ambit of their opinion because "he was not a party to the lawsuit." (Pet. at 7-A) Petitioners could have brought the suit in Timmy's name, as next friend. They did not. They consequently had no standing to raise his alleged rights. *Singleton v. Wulff*, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976).

factual matter, Petitioners had no "implied contractual right" to adopt Timmy, *Perry v. Sindermann*, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), or a "justified expectation" that they would be permitted to adopt Timmy, *Board of Regents v. Roth, supra*, but, on the contrary, were consistently told that their foster care was temporary and were consistently discouraged from any expectation of adopting Timmy. (T. 24-25, 31, 139, 141) Moreover, these questions of "property interests" under the Due Process clause are essentially questions of state law which should be left to the state court. *Board of Regents v. Roth, supra.*

Petitioners also allude to "liberty" interests implicated by the adoption decision, which interests justify the Due Process hearing. Their claim that their reputation was inferentially attacked by the decision was correctly denied by the Court below. *Bishop v. Wood*, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). Similarly, their claim that *they* had a liberty interest, as "psychological parents," in the continuity of the "psychological family" they had developed with Timmy, has never been recognized, was denied as to the foster parents in the *OFFER* cases now on *appeal* to this Court (*Rodriquez v. OFFER*, 76-5193, 45 U.S.L.W. 3320 (October 26, 1976); *Shapiro v. OFFER*, 76-183, and *Smith v. OFFER*, 76-180, 45 U.S.L.W. 3272 (October 12, 1976)), and is based on decisions by this Court which give constitutional deference only to *biological* families. *E.g., Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).[3]

---

[3] The concept of "psychological family" is new and subject to dispute. *See, e.g., OFFER v. Dumpson*, ___ F. Supp. ___ (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (at p. 8 of the opinion, contained in the record at R. 188-208). This Court should refrain from recognizing it until it has been better established by well-tested empirical data. *Cf., Witherspoon v. Illinois*, 391 U.S. 510, 516 (1968). Moreover, being factual in nature and implicating subtle balances in foster care-adoption systems, it may be more appropriate for the legislature to conduct the proper investigation to determine whether the "psychological family" concept should be incorporated into our legal system. *Cf.*, 45 C.F.R. 205 and 214. Finally, even if applicable, this concept is premised on the development of *attachment bonds* which the Petitioners should never have developed (*if* they did) because they knew the nature of their limited role as foster parents.

III. Whether or not the decision below on the Equal Protection question was correct, Petitioners' argument is without merit.

The trial court found that Respondents, in evaluating Petitioners' adoption application, considered, *inter alia*, whether Petitioners, as a white couple, had the appropriate characteristics to *best* parent a mixed-race child. (R. 152, ¶ 19(g); Pet. at 24-A) That finding was supported by the evidence and there was *no* arbitrary exclusion of Petitioners merely because they were white. (Indeed, Respondents do place black and mixed-race children with white parents under appropriate circumstances. (T. 356)) Such an evaluation of race-related attitudes in connection with transracial adoptions is race-neutral, *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n. 20 (1974), is supported by a vast body of sociological literature, *e.g.*, L. Grow and D. Shapiro, *Black Children, White Parents: Study of Transracial Adoptions* (Research Center, Child Welfare League of America, 1974), and is constitutionally permissible. *Compos v. McKeithen*, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La., 1972) (three judge court). *Cf., Wilder v. Sugarman*, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three judge court) (permitting the consideration of religion in adoption proceedings). Not to consider race-related attitudes in transracial adoptions reflects a total indifference to the best interests of the children involved.

Regardless of the Georgia Supreme Court's "standing"

decision on the Equal Protection claim (Pet. at 16), the dismissal of the claim is affirmable under *Ga. Code Ann.* § 81A-108(c) on *res judicata* grounds, *Miller v. Columbus*, 229 Ga. 234 (1972),[4] or under *Ga. Code Ann.* §§ 81A-112(b), 156 as a summary judgment on the basis of the undisputed facts presented by Petitioners and the law as cited above. 6 *Moore's Federal Practice*, ¶ 56.14[1], p. 56-63 (2d Ed. 1975).

CONCLUSION

Because of the Fifth Circuit's February 2, 1977, decision, and based on the arguments contained heretofore, Respondents request that this Court deny Petitioners' application for a Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

ARTHUR K. BOLTON
Attorney General

ROBERT S. STUBBS, II
Executive Assistant Attorney General

DON A. LANGHAM
First Assistant Attorney General

MICHAEL J. BOWERS
Senior Assistant Attorney General

CAROL ATHA COSGROVE
Assistant Attorney General

DANIEL S. REINHARDT
Special Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT L. MOTE
Special Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for Respondents

[4] To the extent such independent state grounds exist to support the *judgment* dismissing the federal claim, grant of certiorari may be improper. *Paschall v. Stewart*, 414 U.S. 100 (1973); *Herb v. Pitcairn*, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945).

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Don A. Langham, one of the attorneys for the Respondents herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that on this date three copies of Respondents' Brief in Opposition were properly mailed, first class postage prepaid, to each of the following:

1. ALAN R. TUREM
   Turem & Kirschner, P.C.
   Suite 355-C
   1874 Piedmont Road, N.E.
   Atlanta, Georgia 30324

2. NEIL BRADLEY
   ACLU Foundation, Inc.
   52 Fairlie Street, N.W.
   Suite 355
   Atlanta, Georgia 30303

3. MARGIE PITTS HAMES
   794 Juniper Street, N.E.
   Atlanta, Georgia 30308

I further certify that all parties required to be served have been served.

This _____ day of _____, 1977.

_____
DON A. LANGHAM
First Assistant Attorney General

APPENDIX

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 76-1888

ROBERT GEORGE DRUMMOND and
MILDRED PAULINE DRUMMOND,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

FULTON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY
AND CHILDREN'S SERVICES, ET AL.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia

---

[February 2, 1976]

Before TUTTLE, GOLDBERG and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the question whether the federal courts can give relief to white foster parents who contend that they have been unconstitutionally denied by Georgia state officials the right to adopt a mixed race child solely on account of race. Neither the trial court nor this Court has the desire nor the authority to second-guess the De-

partment of Family and Children Services on the fitness or suitability of anyone as adoptive parents. Our jurisdiction permits us only to ascertain whether in the adoption process the state has deprived the plaintiffs of a protectable interest under the Fourteenth Amendment without procedural due process or has denied them equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

I. FACTUAL OUTLINE

The record before us, while very sketchy because of the fact that the trial court plainly considered it to be to the best interests of all concerned to keep the hearing on preliminary and permanent injunction narrowly restricted,[1] nevertheless discloses the following facts:

The child, Timothy, known throughout as Timmy, was born out of wedlock on November 17, 1973 to a white mother by a black father. After one month in the care of his natural mother, he was taken into the care of the defendant Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services under the authority of Georgia law, because of the "unfitness" of the mother. On December 15, when he was less than one month old, he was placed in the home of Robert and Mildred Drummond, the

[1] The hearing, by order dated January 14, 1976, was set down for January 23 on a motion for preliminary injunction. Following abbreviated discovery by interrogatories and depositions, the trial court on June [sic] 23, when the hearing commenced, stated that the case would be considered on the merits. Both parties stated that they had insufficient time, but they may have waived any objection to the order of consolidation. On appeal the appellants, plaintiffs below, claim that they are entitled to a reversal of the order of dismissal on the merits because of inadequate notice and time for preparation for a consolidation under Rule 65(A)(2) F.R.C.P. In light of the disposition we make of the case, we need not reach this contention.

plaintiffs, as foster parents. At this time, Mrs. Drummond was 49 or 50 years old and her husband was 37 or 38 (the record does not show their birthdates but at the time of the action by the defendants here complained of, they were 51 and 39 respectively).

For 15 months, until March 10, 1975, the Drummonds cared for Timmy in their home as a child of their own in a manner subsequently described by the caseworkers and supervisors, both foster home and adoption personnel, as "excellent," "loving," "extremely competent" so that at that time he was described by such personnel as "an extremely bright, highly verbal, outgoing 15-month-old baby boy."

Home visits by foster home caseworkers were infrequent, but some contact was maintained by telephone, especially when the Drummonds desired to leave town for trips. Some time late in 1974, it came to the attention of the then current caseworker Barbara Osgood, that the Drummonds wished to adopt Timmy. She had not then seen Timmy or the Drummonds, but the problem of the Drummonds' request was submitted to a "staffing." This was a conference which included Osgood's supervisor, Mrs. Grape, Mrs. Dallinger, the adoption supervisor, and one or two other personnel. It is apparent that none of these staff people had seen either Timmy or the Drummonds. Miss Osgood's description of what occurred at the staffing follows:

> "A. Well, it centered around the fact that we knew the Drummonds would like to adopt Timmy, and Miss Grape talked a great deal of time about she was black and she talked a great deal of the time about experience that she had known or heard of of black or mixed race children growing up in white homes. And she had, you know, some real feelings that this was not a good plan to *this type* of child, that

they face too many problems as a result of *that kind* of placement.

So after, you know, some discussion was made about that, the decision was made for Miss Grape and Miss Dallinger to talk with the Drummonds and to try to express, you know, some of our concerns about what we felt was in Timmy's best interest; and, also, the question was brought up that if the Drummonds *were not amenable to our plan*, would we move Timmy to a black foster home feeling that, you know, it would be better if we were going to have him adopted by a black couple, to have him in a black foster home if there was going to be any length of time before he was free.

Q. Was there a decision made at that staffing that you recall? Was there a vote taken in any way?

A. No. There was no vote taken. I think I commented at the time that it seemed to me that the decision had already been made.

Q. What do you feel the decision was?

A. I think the decision was that it would be in Timmy's best interest to be adopted by a black couple." (Emphasis added.)

On March 10, Mrs. Grape and Miss Dallinger had the Drummonds bring Timmy to the office to carry out the decision made at the "staffing." Mr. Drummond testified that at the conference: "Mrs. Grape said she thought Timmy should be adopted by a black family." The following testimony then followed:

"Q. What did you say when you were told that Miss Grape, by Miss Grape, that she thought it would be best for Timmy to be placed with a black couple?

THE COURT: Black couple?
MRS. HAMES: Sir?
THE COURT: What did you say?

BY MRS. HAMES:

Q. Black couple. Is that the terminology they used, or black family or black parents?

A. Black family, I believe.

Q. What was your response to that?

A. Well, my wife and myself thought that we should be able to adopt Timmy, that we would like to have him.

Q. All right, Was there anything said about it being to his advantage for him to grow up in the black community?

A. I think Miss Grape said something to that effect.

Q. Did you and your wife ever accept the fact that you couldn't adopt Timmy, that he had to be adopted by black parents?

A. No, we did not.

Q. Did you ever do anything about it after you were told—this March meeting, what did you do after that, toward adopting Timmy?

A. Well, we told them we would like to adopt him and told the case worker."

Mrs. Drummond's testimony as to this interview was as follows:

"Q. Okay. What did they tell you about whether they were going to permit you to adopt him?

A. They told us that—Miss Grape did the talking, and Miss Grape said that since Timmy was a mixed child, that she felt, and she felt that the Department felt, that Timmy would be better off raised in a black family.

Q. Did you accept that at that time?

A. I tried to accept it. But I could not.

Q. What further steps did you take to try to adopt Timmy?

A. I called and talked with the case workers and repeatedly told them that we wanted to adopt Timmy. And then when Mrs. Osgood came out to our home, we told her how much we wanted to adopt Timmy and would they please give us another meeting, that we would try and let them know how much we wanted Timmy.

Q. Okay. Back up to the March meeting. Were you told at that meeting that you were too old to adopt him?

A. No.

Q. When did you move to Douglas County?

A. Within eight months.

Q. Did anyone ever tell you it would hurt your chances to adopt Timmy if you moved to Douglas County?

A. No, Ma'am.

Q. Would you have moved to Douglas County had you known?

A. No, indeed, had we known.

Q. Are you willing to return to the City of Atlanta?

A. We're packing to move back to Fulton County to the City of Atlanta now.

Q. In the March meeting, did Miss Dallinger or Miss Grape discuss the community in which they thought Timmy should live?

A. They told us that they felt that he would be—Miss Grape stated that she felt that he would be better off raised in a black community."

A memorandum for the files was prepared by Mrs. Grape as follows:

"On 3/10/75 Mr. and Mrs. Drummond, foster parents, were in the office with Timothy Hill, foster child. Nancy Hartzog kept Timothy in the playroom while Helen Grape and Kay Dallinger had a personal conference with Mr. and Mrs. Drummond. The Drummonds now admit that Timothy is a mixed race child of Black/White heritage. They did some superficial denial of the idea that this fact would cause Timothy any problems in remaining in their home. They did not, however, push for them to be allowed to adopt Timothy. As a matter of fact, they stated they could let Timothy go to a young, energetic, religious, *adoptive* couple. They expressed primary concern that he not be moved from their home to another *foster* home as they believed he would not receive the quality of care they are giving him in another foster home. They feel that separation from Timothy will tear their hearts out but that they can do it because it would be best for Timothy in the long run. They seem quite accepting when Ms. Grape and Ms. Dallinger verbalized for them that Timothy would, in our opinion, make a better adjustment and have a better chance in life with a Black couple in the Black community.

We further explained our efforts to work with the natural mother, the expected time involved before we could get either a voluntary release or be prepared for court action to terminate parental rights. We said the mother was not a bad person but a sad person—immature not ready for responsibility. We stated we needed to make further efforts to rehabilitate her before a final decision is reached. We estimated a minimum of six months to one year before we will even know if adoption is the plan for

Timothy. Ms. Dallinger explained that even the ( ) months more would be involved in working with him to fully know Timothy, select the right adoptive home, and slowly move Timothy. Ms. Drummond cried in anticipation of eventual separation. Both Mr. and Mrs. Drummond expressed appreciation in knowing the truth. The truth being 1) we are working towards adoption for Timothy outside their home; 2) it may take one to two years to accomplish this goal; 3) the rehabilitation of the mother's home is a slim possibility but still a possibility; 4) because of the excellent care the Drummonds have provided for Timothy, we (the agency) are more than willing for the Drummonds to keep Timothy on a foster care basis until a permanent plan can be made if the Drummonds are willing to keep him under these circumstances. The Drummonds committed themselves to giving the child all the love and care they can give him as foster parents and to eventually helping Timothy to separate from them and move to a permanent adoptive home. They reemphasized that they could 'love and let go.'

ADDITIONAL NOTE: We agreed to keep them informed of any progress that we make in working with the natural mother or in court action. Ms. Grape suggested 11/75 as a good review date since Timothy will be two years old that month. Timothy was observed on this date to be an extremely bright, highly verbal, outgoing, 15 month old baby boy. His complexion is light olive. He has a definite Afro and is a physically appealing mixed race child." (Emphasis in original)

A letter was then sent to the Drummonds which is copied here verbatim:

"March 17, 1975

Mr. and Mrs. Robert Drummond
2390 Fabin Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30318

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Drummond:

This is to confirm with you our understandings and agreements during our office conference on 3/10/75. As you will recall, on this date we explained our efforts to work with Timothy's natural mother and the time involved before we could get either a voluntary release or be prepared for court action to terminate parental rights. However, we also explained that we would continue further efforts to rehabilitate Timothy's natural mother before a final decision was made. The estimated time span would be approximately six months to one year before this decision would be reached. If adoption becomes legally possible, months will be involved in working with you, fully knowing Timothy, selecting the right adoptive home, and slowly moving Timothy into a permanent adoptive home.

Both of you expressed appreciation in knowing specific steps that the department would take in working with Timothy. These steps are:

1) we are working towards adoption for Timothy outside your home;
2) it may take one to two years to accomplish this goal;
3) the rehabilitation of the mother's home is a slim possibility but still a possibility;

4) because of the excellent care you have provided for Timothy, the agency is happy for you to keep Timothy on a foster care basis until a permanent plan can be made, if you are willing to keep him under these circumstances, and you stated in our meeting that you wanted to keep him until a permanent plan could be made.

You committed yourselves to giving Timothy all the love and care that you could give him as his foster parents and also eventually to helping Timothy to separate from you and move into a permanent adoptive home. Thank you for your love and concern for this precious child.

Sincerely,
Ms. Kay Dallinger
Casework Supervisor III—Adoptions

Mrs. Helen Grape
Casework Supervisor III—Foster Care"

Mrs. Drummond testified that they continued to make known to their caseworker thereafter their desire to adopt Timmy. This is confirmed by Mrs. Osgood, their caseworker, who testified:

"A. After I read this [the memorandum of March 11, *supra*] I thought, well, that perhaps things had been resolved with the Drummonds and that it appeared that they were in agreement with us. So I went out to do the foster home re-evaluation interview thinking this was decided and that they would have, you know, have been in agreement with this plan for Timmy. I was really surprised when I got out there, because to hear their interpretation of it, that they were not in agreement with it at all.

And, you know, I don't know whether it is because they had changed their minds in the interim

period or whether we had heard what we wanted to hear in the interview, but at any rate, they certainly were not in agreement with what this states when I went out there.

Q. What did they want to do when you went out there? What was their opinion? What was their approach to you?

A. Well, they had stated that they had been talking with their foster care worker who was Mollie Bartlett at that time and were requesting an interview with the adoption staff to, again, state their desire to adopt Timmy.

Mrs. Drummond said she had not heard anything about it, and so I told her after I wrote up my evaluation that I would write a memo to Mrs. Dallinger bringing it to her attention that the Drummonds were still interested. I did that soon after the evaluation.

Q. Go ahead.

A. I received a reply stating that the Drummonds would be given an interview after Timmy's termination hearing."

On August 15 Miss Mollie Bartlett wrote a memorandum to Mrs. Dallinger as follows:

"On 3-10-75, you met with Mrs. Grape and the Robert Drummonds, Timmy's foster family. At the conclusion of the conference the Drummonds were planning to care for Timmy until he was freed for adoption and to help him adjust to the adoptive home when adoption occurred. For a short time they seemed to fully accept the premise that Timmy would be better placed in a black home.

Today, after nearly six months, the Drummonds are requesting an opportunity to be reconsidered as adoptive parents for Timmy. They have no reservations about their acceptance of a mixed race child. Mrs.

Drummond's health had once seemed questionable, but her doctor found gallstones and as soon as she has surgery, she foresees no further health problems."

Mrs. Dallinger replied:

"In response to your memo regarding the Drummonds' renewed interest in adopting Timmy, I have learned that the termination petition has been filed and the hearing set for 9/25/75 at 9:30. Under the circumstances the Drummonds should bring Timmy to the *office* for the hearing, and you should bring him to the juvenile court.

I personally feel that the Drummonds are back into their earlier denial pattern. The approach I recommend for you is to stall with no encouragement. Example . . . 'No one can be considered for the adoption of Timmy until he is freed. Adoption staff would have to carefully examine any possible home for Timmy, particularly a white home such as yours. I don't want to encourage you. The best thing for you to do is think about this some more and discuss this with the adoption staff. If and when he is freed, I have advised adoption that you have changed your mind.'

Thank you for alerting us to the situation."
(Emphasis in original.)

Thereafter, about August 25, Mrs. Osgood made the re-evaluation as a result of which she described the foster parents in the following terms:

"The foster parents provide excellent care. They are unusually attentive to the child's medical and emotional needs and feel as if they are the 'natural family'."

Under the heading on the evaluation form "Particular Strength of Home," Mrs. Osgood wrote:

"The Drummonds have accepted a mixed race child and have handled the attendant problems well. They are a very loving, warm family."

Finally, she made the following recommendation for the Drummonds as foster parents: "I recommend this home for a child of either sex, age 0 to 3."

This re-evaluation report was accompanied by a memorandum again addressed to Mrs. Dallinger:

"I recently did the foster home re-evaluation on the above named couple. As you will recall on March 11, 1975, you and Helen Grape interviewed Mr. and Mrs. Drummond regarding their expressed interest in adopting Timmy. For your convenience a copy of the notes from that conference are attached.

I spoke with Mr. and Mrs. Drummond for over two hours and during this time I also had a chance to observe Timmy. As a result of my conversation I have the distinct impression that the Drummonds did not adequately express their feelings on the March 11th interview. In the foster home re-evaluation they stated unequivocally and emphatically their desire to adopt Timmy. They rejected the notion that he would make a better adjustment in a Black home by pointing out that Timmy has always been around White people and this has been incorporated into his self-concept. They do not understand why we would remove a child from a home where he has been since birth and replace him because we believe he will have a better 'chance' in the Black community.

The Drummonds expressed their intention to give Timmy every opportunity possible to develop as a human being, regardless of race. I talked with them about community acceptance and the possibility of Timmy dating a Black girl when he gets older. The Drummonds acknowledged that Timmy would be 'different,' but felt he would have problems in the Black community also. They noted that Timmy would make his own decisions as to who he would date and they would have no objections to his choice. They pointed out that they make no secret of Timmy's

Black heritage and felt that they would deal forthrightly with Timmy on this subject.

Timmy is an exceptionally well-adjusted child. There is no question that he is the center of this household. He talks in sentences, counts to ten, and shows off for visitors by strumming the guitar and singing gospel songs. The fact that he is bright, active, and friendly is a tribute to the excellent care he is receiving from these parents.

Because of the intensity of their feelings for Timmy, the Drummonds are again requesting a conference with you to discuss adoption. I believe they will explore every possibility in their efforts to keep Timmy first within the agency, but using outside resources if it becomes necessary.

I hope this information will be helpful. I understand Timmy's termination hearing is set for September 25th, 1975."

To this memo Mrs. Dallinger replied:

> "Thank you for your memo of 9/3/75 concerning this case. I have discussed the case with Ms. Staten. We feel it is inappropriate to decide the matter prior to termination proceedings on 9/25/75. I will throw the issue open to the adoption committee at the end of September, if he is freed. Regardless of any decisions made, you may assure the Drummonds that they will be given further interviews with me or other adoption staff about this matter. Early October would appear to be the best time for this and I will see that they are contacted. Please loan me any case files you have on the Drummonds."

On September 25, the Juvenile Court of Fulton County entered what is known as a "Termination Order," ending the parental rights of Timmy's natural mother and placing his custody in the Georgia Department of Human

Resources, Division of Family and Children Services, granting the Division the right to place Timmy for adoption.

Thereupon, on October 3 a "Social Study on Child to be Placed" was made for Timmy. It was made by an adoptions caseworker named Phyllis Jonas. This study described the child as having "medium olive" skin, "dark brown," "thick rather coarse and wavy hair" and as being a "very attractive child," normal physically and mentally, stating "child is well adjusted and happy. He is a bright verbal child."

This study was followed by an "evaluation interview" by caseworker Brenda B. Payne. Her report, which contained a recommendation that the Drummonds be permitted to adopt Timmy, is quoted in full:

> "Mr. and Mrs. Drummond arrived early for their interview. They brought Timmy with them. He continues to be an extremely alert, happy and attractive child. While I interviewed the Drummonds, Mrs. Holloway, Timmy's worker care[d] for him in the playroom. The Drummonds were obviously very nervous and anxious at first.
>
> Initially I reviewed the past events with them, their meeting with Mrs. Dallinger and Mrs. Grape, the decision made at that time, and their change of heart later. As Ms. Hauben's contacts indicated, the Drummonds have had a chance to think about their interview last spring, and have come to the conclusion that adoption by another couple may not be what is best for Timmy.
>
> The Drummonds expressed their feelings that although everyone wants to do 'what's best for Timmy' on re-considering they seriously wonder if placing him in another home, and putting him through the trauma of a move would be in his best interest. The agency

seems to be saying that putting him in a black home would be the prime consideration thinking 'what's best for Timmy.' The Drummonds stated they felt they knew Timmy better than any agency personnel, they've cared for him, watched him grow and develop, and perhaps they know best what would be best for him.

I told the Drummonds that part of my functions was to sit down with them and think together what would be best for Timmy—that frankly none of us were really sure of what would be best at this point. I spent a good deal of time in finding out about the Drummond's orientation toward blacks and the black community. Although the Drummonds admitted to having some degree of racial prejudice in long years past, due to their age and society's focus(?) they felt that their ( ) had change[d] every year before getting Timmy. Mr. Drummond states he's had lots of relationships with blacks thru his job, and has worked under a black supervisor.

He spoke in positive terms of these relationships, Mrs. Drummond said she had worked as a nurse several years ago and had worked closely with many black people and she also said that with their contacts with people in the gospel singing world, many more blacks were involved as musicians and performers than in years past. They had worked closely with many black performers and seen [sic] able to form very good relationships with them.

Although there are no blacks living in their area in Douglasville, Mr. Drummond remarked that they live in a subdivision with many young families. He stated they had never had any problems with Timmy's being accepted by the neighbors, and seemed to feel that the young adults of today are much more accepting of people of other races. The Drummonds indicated that Timmy had been enrolled in an integrated kindergarten setting, but Mrs. Drummond was advised to take him out for awhile by Timmy's doctor due to his

bouts with tonsillitis. The public school nearby is integrated; however, the majority of the children who attend are white.

We talked some about whether or not Timmy understand[s] he's different yet. They said that he's really too young to yet be aware that he is, but as he gets older they certainly will try to be as open with him as they can about his heritage and race. (According to Ms. Holloway, with her contacts with Timmy it is evident he's not yet aware of any colors yet and cannot identify by name colors like red or green, or cannot say what color he is).

Although Timmy has not yet noticed that he is different Mr. and Mrs. Drummond were certainly able to acknowledge that other people have noticed. They are aware that Timmy will be noticed and are aware they will have to help him through many hard times in his life. Mrs. Drummond said she knows they will have to handle people reactions to Timmy; they certainly don't deny they've already had to handle stares and comments from people of both races. Mr. Drummond said people of both races. Mr. Drummond says people stop and ask what nationality he is and he tells them. He says he wants Timmy to be proud of the fact that he is part black. Mr. and Mrs. Drummond both said that although they've [sic] certain Timmy may face ridicule or rejection at times, they feel if he has their love and support, as well as his gift of openness, friendliness, and very high intelligence, that this would enable him to have a happy and secure life. Mrs. Drummond expressed her belief that ( ) was responsible for making Timmy such an exceptionally gifted and friendly child, so that in spite of problems about his race he will be liked and accepted by those who come to know him personally.

The Drummonds are very much aware of Timmy's exceptional mental abilities. They definitely plan to send him to college if he wants to go, and stated they

hoped maybe he would want to be a professional person such as a doctor or lawyer. I feel they recognize that he may need much more stimulation as he gets older, and seemed willing to consider outside resources, special schools or tutors in order to help him reach his potential.

When we taked in detail about some of the specific problems Timmy might face because of his race, Mrs. Drummond reacted in a strongly protective manner. She said if she ever heard of a teacher or anyone else giving him trouble because of his race, she'd 'go down there and give them a piece of my mind.' I tried to help them see that while it would be good to support Timmy during these times that if they're over protective they wouldn't give Timmy the chance to become independent and able to stand up for himself. I noted, that one of the advantages Timmy would have in a black home would be that he would be given survival skills, would be given guidance from people of the black race as to how to protect himself and win difficult situations. It would be much easier for a black parent to give him these skills than would a white parent, as they would be teaching him from their own experience. Although the Drummonds understood what I was saying, they felt that the most important thing Timmy needed, to be secure and happy about himself, was to have parents who truly loved him.

We talked about how the rest of the Drummonds extended family felt about Timmy. The Drummonds said that all of their family their brothers and sisters, and Mrs. Drummond['s] mother dearly loved Timmy. Mr. Drummond's parents are deceased. Mrs. Drummond said her mother called her before our meeting today to say she'd be 'waiting by the phone to hear the results.' Evidently the whole family is behind the Drummonds 100% and Timmy is fully accepted by them all.

I spent a lot of time in talking with the Drummonds

about things they might have to face with Timmy—the social pressures, the feelings of insecurity he might have, and especially problems which might arise during adolescence in regard to dating and peer group relationships. I gave them true case examples from articles I'd read about blacks raised in white homes, although I did have to admit there were both very negative and positive experiences these children had. The pros and cons were about equal in those situations. I showed the Drummonds pictures of our foster child Jackie who is a mixed race five year old, showing how much he had darkened over the years.

As I expected, none of these things seemed to change the Drummonds' mind. They felt they love Timmy now and will always love him regardless of what color he becomes or what culture he wants to identify with. They indicated that the agency thought they were good enough to raise Timmy up till now, so on what basis other than race were we unwilling to consider them as adoptive parents. Mr. and Mrs. Drummond were not hostile, toward this agency, but they again stated they felt that the fact that they loved Timmy and he loved them was the most important thing for the agency to consider.

I tried to discover how far the Drummonds would be willing to prepare themselves should they be allowed to raise Timmy. They would be willing to do anything we suggested to go through a series of intensive interviews with black caseworkers to help them understand the black culture and heritage, to read books and other literature in order to educate themselves in the black experience, and to talk with their own black friends at work about their feelings and experiences about being black. They were extremely cooperative and seemed willing to accept any help we could give them.They were very interested in hearing about the Buechle couple and would be very interested in being put in touch with them.

At the present time our relationship with the Drummonds remains good. They are not hostile or angry and are very willing to accept supervision or guidance from us. However, they did make it clear they loved Timmy enough to fight for him and would take the matter to court if necessary. I do fear if this result[s], and the Drummonds win in court we would have damaged any chance we would have to give them guidance and help in raising Timmy, as our relationship with them would most probably be destroyed. They are pushing for a decision to be made soon. Mrs. Drummond says this situation has caused them lots of worry and heartache; she said Timmy is at a crucial period in his life, and he needs to be given some security, instead of living under this threat of removal. The Drummonds understand the decision is not mine to make, that it will be a committee decision, they do ask that this matter be resolved soon for everyone's sake. I told the Drummonds they would be notified of our decision as soon as possible.

Observation and Recommendations:

In thinking about the agency's position in this case I still can see it remains a two-sided thing. In my brief contact with this family I had both positive and negative feelings as have other workers.

I was concerned about how intensely the Drummonds relate to Timmy; it turns me off a little to see them getting him to 'perform or do tricks.' The reasons for this may be positive or negative—he may be a novelty or toy for them, or they may just be over-emphasizing his achievements and getting him to perform to prove to caseworkers they are taking good care of him and stimulating him. I don't know what may be the cause, but I definitely hope this pattern would not continue as he grows up. I also understand from other workers that Mrs. Drummond has an almost hypochondriac focus on Timmy's health. There definitely is a fear he

could be pampered, spoiled and over protected by them.

Also, on considering the Drummonds' age and back ground, it does seem their attempts to help Timmy understand his black heritage will be admittedly artificial though sincere and honest in motivation. Whether or not the Drummonds can become comfortable with the subject of race over the years, so that their attempts will be natural and spontaneous is anybody's guess.

I also am very much aware that in intellect and intelligence Timmy is far above the Drummonds. Although they can offer adequate stimulation now, who is to say how much they'll be able to stimulate Timmy as he grows up. Certainly to 'waste' his intelligence would be a shame, although if he develops a trauma because of being moved he could become a very intelligent culture but perhaps insecure and unhappy individual.

On the positive side I can definitely see that Timmy is loved by the Drummonds, and he loves them. They do not seem to have tried to 'hide Timmy' and are constantly taking him to public places, gospel shows etc. They seem to have so far instilled in him a good feeling about himself and he seems happy and well adjusted. So far they seems [sic] able to deal with his racial identity in an acceptable manner. The Drummonds do have more involvement with blacks than we had first thought, and do seem to be in the early stages of developing healthy attitudes about black people.

The fact that their other family members are supporting them about Timmy is also a positive.

Because the Drummonds are not from the kind of upper-middle class achievement oriented home most caseworkers come from it does make it hard to visualize seeing Timmy grow up 'successfully' in this kind of culture. However who really can say what kind of

environment is best to grow up in?

In conclusion, I personally feel for several reasons we should let Timmy remain with the Drummonds, in spite of our concerns. Either way there are risks and no guarantees. The fact that there presently are no appropriate homes for Timmy, and the fact that he might also experience some rejection by some members of the black community due to his 'whiteness' is also a consideration. Also my concern that we most probably would be facing court action by the Drummonds with some doubt as to the 'strength of our case' is also a factor. For Timmy's well being I do not feel that a long court involvement would be beneficial regardless of what the court's decision is. The Drummonds are evidently living under a great deal of stress and eventually this may be transferred on to Timmy.

I do feel that a group concensus, is probably the best way to decide what to do. This certainly is too risky a situation for any one person to make the decision alone, I hope the group will be able to meet and decide some thing soon."

Acting on Mrs. Payne's recommendation, a group was called on November 11 to conduct a "staffing," which is apparently a word of art to describe a discussion by staff personnel who presumably are experienced in the area of concern. Of the 19 persons present at the staffing the record does not indicate that more than four had seen Timmy or the Drummond family. Of the six or seven caseworkers and supervisors who had seen the child and his foster parents, it appears that Mrs. Grape, Mollie Bartlett, and Barbara Osgood were not present at the staffing. The record does not clearly establish the precise time, place or form of the final action which the defendant Department or its officials took that denied the Drummonds' request to adopt the child. Neither does it show precisely what authority any one of the participating staff persons had to make the final decision. It appears that the

officials treated the vote taken at the staffing as representing final denial of the Drummonds' request. In any event, Mrs. Drummond testified that a few days after the staffing, she and her husband were called to the office and met with Mrs. Dallinger and Mrs. Holloway and that the former said to them: "I am sure that you are both very anxious to know what has happened and we called you in to tell you that the *decision still stands*, that we feel that Timmy will be better off adopted by a black couple or a black family."[2] (Emphasis added.)

At the trial, during her testimony, Mrs. Dallinger gave a different interpretation of the March conversation, saying that the reference to black family was to indicate that it would be more likely that a black adoptive home would be available. Her testimony follows:

"Q. Actually, you had made a tentative decision at the March meeting to place him in a black home if you gained the parental rights?

A. I thought that would be the likelihood of the home that would be available, but even all the way through after the final decision was made when I asked the State for homes, I did not ask for black homes. I asked for whatever homes were available for this child.

Q. Reading again from your testimony in your deposition on page twenty-six, 'So there had been a request to adopt that you know'—talking about the Drummond—'is that right? And the request had been made in spite of your knowledge of his mixed race, of his being a mixed race child?

A. That's right.

Q. Did you verbalize an opinion that he would be

[2] Apparently the only "decision" to which reference could be made was the decision made at the March 11 staffing which, it will be remembered, preceded the first meeting between Mrs. Dallinger and Mrs. Grape with the Drummonds.

better, make a better adjustment and have a better life with a black couple in the black community?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did Miss Grape verbalize that?

A. Yes.

Q. Actually, you had made a tentative decision at that time to place him in a black home if you gained—had his parental rights terminated; is that correct?

A. That's right.

Q. Did you make that—

Q. That was a tentative decision that he would go into what we thought would be probably a black home. You have to understand the supplies of homes that are available."

Mrs. Dallinger testified further about the November meeting:

"Q. . . . In the November meeting did you tell Mr. and Mrs. Drummond that the decision had been made to place Timmy in a black home?

A. Yes, because then we had made the final decision that they could not adopt, and we had then selected the home, so, yes, we knew the home then.

Q. Did you have the—

A. That was definite then.

Q. At the time you told them?

A. Uh huh. In November. I told the characteristics about the home that had been selected, you know, that I thought maybe would help them realize Timmy was going to go to a good home.

Q. At the time I'm talking about, maybe, the staff

meeting, the decision was made there to place Timmy in a black home.

A. In the staffing meeting?

Q. In the staffing meeting.

A. *No. We didn't decide where to place Timmy.* We decided that we would place him for adoption outside of their home. We were trying to make a decision in that meeting whether it would be in Timmy's best interest to leave him with the Drummonds and allow them to adopt him or place him up for adoption outside, to seek adoptive homes outside of, you know, of them.

Q. Did you not decide at that meeting that Timmy would be placed in a black adoptive home?

A. No. I don't believe so. I think we talked about, again, in terms of the supply, we thought that was probably what would be available.

THE COURT: Show her this last paragraph.

[The last paragraph reads: 'A vote was taken and it was a group decision that it would not be in Timmy's best interest to leave him in the Drummond home, and that we would begin immediately to look for an appropriate black adoptive home. Although this was a difficult decision it was felt that Timmy's long range best interest must be the focus.']

BY MRS. HAMES:

Q. Referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, the discussion of race, I would ask, that purports to be notes from that meeting, and I ask if that correctly sets forth the decision?

A. These are not my notes. That may have been the understanding of the person that wrote these notes.

Q. So you are denying that now?

A. Huh?

Q. You are denying that the decision was made at that meeting to place Timmy in a black home?

A. We talked in that meeting about mixed children and where they seem to adjust better and what kind of black couple—what kind of a white couple could accept these children, you know, what were the characteristics of those couples. I think our general feeling, you know, at the end of that meeting that it would likely be a black home, you know, available for him that would fit those requirements, but like I said, you have to understand the procedure. After we rule out one home, then we look at the pool of homes available, and we look at all homes available. But in the minds of all of us at the meeting—

Q. Did you have a black home available?

MR. MOTE: Your Honor, I think she was in the middle of her answer.

THE COURT: Did you complete your answer?

MRS. HAMES: I'm sorry.

THE WITNESS: What did I start to say?

MR. MOTE: I think you were saying in the minds of us at the meeting—

THE WITNESS: Well, we knew about the pool of homes in Fulton County. That is the homes that we recruit, study, develop, this kind of thing. And we had already looked there, and we knew there was no suitable white or black homes. There were both black and white homes approved and waiting for children, but none that we thought met Timmy's other needs.

So we didn't feel like we had a home in Fulton, and we knew we would have to ask the State. And we've had a number of mixed race children lately, and we haven't gotten but one white home that I know of in a long time for a mixed race child. That was a home studied by Child Service and Family Counseling, and then we've had one mixed marriage home, you know, available in the county that we could have looked at for Timmy, which we did, I believe. So we already, you know, had some awareness of what the supply of homes available for him were. The supply didn't include any white homes that we knew of." (Emphasis added.)

Finally, Brenda Payne, whose re-evaluation recommendation was that the Drummonds be permitted to adopt Timmy, and who was present at the staffing, testified at the trial:

"Q. Did you interview the Drummonds in connection with their desire to adopt a child by the name of Timmy?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you also participate in a staff meeting in November in which the question was considered?

A. Yes.

Q. I hand you Plaintiff's Exhibit 15 and direct your attention to the paragraph numbered seven.

A. Yes.

Q. In the second paragraph there, it says: 'After dis-

cussion, the staff was convinced if we left him in his present environment, we would be giving him problems he would not have if placed in a black home.'

A. I've lost where that is. Where would that be?

Q. Excuse me. The second paragraph under number seven.

A. At present Timmy is so young? Oh, I see. Okay.

Q. And then it goes on to say: 'A vote was taken, and it was a group decision that it would not be in Timmy's best interest to leave him in the Drummond home and that we would begin immediately searching'—is that what that is—'and'—

A. Immediately to—I don't know. 'Seek' maybe? 'Seek,' maybe, an appropriate—

Q. Search immediately for an appropriate black adoptive home; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Was that the decision at that meeting?

A. Yes. That the Drummonds would not adopt Timmy.

Q. What about that you would seek a black adoptive home?

A. I believe that was the decision."

The Drummonds were not present at the "staffing" of November 21. No physician or psychiatrist was present. The Drummonds were not given an opportunity to present any statements or evidence and there is no indication that they were put on notice of the basis on which the decision might rest. Of course, it is apparent from the face of the documents that no findings of fact were made as to any of the possible grounds of challenging their qualifications as adoptive parents, *i.e.*, on account of

being foster parents, being older than desirable, or not being in good health or of limited intellectual capacity. It is apparent that they were attempting at all times to resist only the possible removal of Timmy to a black family or home, because of his being a mixed race child.

As indicated already, it is impossible to determine precisely what authoritative tribunal or responsible official actually made the decision and, of course, it follows that it is impossible to tell the basis on which the decision was made. The record clearly establishes two elements that could not have provided an automatic basis for disqualifying the Drummonds. These two elements, which were discussed by the parties at the trial and are added as make-weights on appeal in an effort to support the action of the Department, are the mere fact that the Drummonds were foster parents and the fact, standing alone, that Mrs. Drummond at the time of the staffing was 51 years of age and her husband was 39. The record clearly eliminates these factors as automatically excluding the Drummonds from consideration in view of the consistent pattern by which the participants repeatedly stated, after all of the facts with respect to the Drummonds' age and their status as foster parents were fully known, that they were given full consideration as adoptive parents by the Department. This is not to say that in passing on the qualifications of the Drummonds as adoptive parents those responsible for making the decision could not take into consideration the actual age of the persons involved. It merely excludes the age factor and the somewhat discussed policy of discouraging adoptions by foster parents as automatic grounds for justifying the denial of the Drummonds' application.

We have outlined as fully as we have the record facts

not in order to weigh them and determine whether they would have warranted the proper officials from arriving at the same ultimate decision as announced by Mrs. Dallinger to the Drummonds after the staffing. We have given these facts to show the substance back of the plaintiffs' contention that they were deprived of what they describe as the right to parentage under the theory that a close familial attachment to Timmy with the consent of the defendants over a period of two years created a protectable interest in the relationship under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The recitation also shows the substantial nature of the equal protection claim of the Drummonds, that is to say that even if they should concede that they had not acquired any protectable interest in their family relationship with Timmy, they, nevertheless have been denied equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, because they were not permitted to compete equally for the adoption of this mixed race child because, as they allege, the defendants denied their request for adoption arbitrarily because of their race.

In the ensuing trial in the district court in which the Drummonds urged their contentions, the court, without dealing specifically with the due process claim, concluded that the decision of the defendants did not violate either the plaintiffs' § 1983 or constitutional rights.[3]

[3] The court's verbal order follows:

"THE COURT: All right, I'll rule for the defendants. This case comes to the Court on a complaint, the crux of which is that the defendant's refusal to place said child with plaintiffs for adoption, based solely on racial grounds, is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws and an unlawful violation of the civil rights of the plaintiffs.

Therefore, the issue before the Court is to determine whether the decision of the Department of Fulton County Department of Family

[3] —Continued.
and Children Services was one solely based upon the impermissible criteria of race, or whether the race, to the extent that it entered into the decision, was only that legitimate consideration thereof which is—which the Court holds necessarily as required in determining the proper placement of a child.

It is obvious that race did enter into the decision of the Department. The Court has read from beginning to end each of the exhibits which have been submitted by the Plaintiff, some of which throw considerable light on the question, particularly the question, particularly Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, if I'm not mistaken.

THE CLERK: Here is 15, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Which shows just—which, as far as the Court can tell, although there is no date on it, affords a contemporaneous version of the actual decision that took place, and where it is obvious that race did take place, it appears to the Court therefrom that the consideration of race was properly directed to the best interest of the child and was not an automatic-type of thing or of placement, that is, that all blacks go to black families, all whites go to white families, and all mixed children go to black families, which would be prohibited.

In fact, certain statistics indicate that despite the difficulty, despite the difficulty of determining proper homes for mixed race children as is shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit 19, nevertheless, the interrogatories —answers to interrogatories which have been received, show that there have been some placements of mixed race children with white parents.

So, apparently, it is not an automatic-type of placement which the Court holds to have been forbidden. Therefore, the Court feels that the Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case under Title 42, Section 1983, of the Code of the United States or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

I dissolve the temporary restraining order, refuse to issue the preliminary injunction, and will dismiss the case. I want to say at this point, though, that I am very much afraid from what I have seen in the papers and from the questions which have been asked and so forth that people have been, perhaps, even the plaintiffs here, have been under the impression that this Court has plenary authority with respect to this matter to determine which is the proper or the best home for adoption, that is, to make a choice between the Plaintiff's home and the home of whoever has been selected by the Fulton County Department. That is not the function of this Court at all. If there has been some error in the handling of the case by the Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services, so far as the

Following denial of their claim by the district court, the Drummonds filed a suit in the Superior Court of Fulton County, in which they alleged a denial of their rights as foster parents without a due process hearing and also alleged denial of their rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That court dismissed the suit and the Georgia Supreme Court has affirmed, *Drummond, et al. v. Fulton Co. Dept. of Family & Children Services, et al.*, (Ga. Sup Ct., Sept. 7, 1976) ____ S.E. ____. In its decision, the Georgia Supreme Court discussed the Drummonds' contention as follows:

> "The Drummonds next urge that any application of the 'best interest of the child' rule necessarily implies some de facto rights arising from the psychological dependency of a parent/child relationship which has been sustained over a period of time. Plaintiffs' expert witnesses testified to the trauma of separating a young child such as Timmy from the only parents he has ever known at an age when the separation could not adequately be understood or explained to him. *See* Alternatives to 'Parental Rights' in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 15 (1963). The best interest of the child test has been adopted in many

---

[3]—Continued.
Court knows, at least the Plaintiff so alleged, it is subject to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, in which case the Georgia courts will have authority to determine whether the procedures have been violated. And, perhaps, although the Court does understand that there is a large discretion vested in the Defendant Department, that if there have been any procedural irregularities, the Georgia courts can cure those irregularities. But so far as this Court is concerned, it has had before it the very narrow question of whether the question of race impermissibly entered into the decision of the Defendant Department so as to block the legitimate consideration of factors which ought to have been made by them.

This record, as submitted by Plaintiff, the Plaintiff's case did not show a prima facie case, and the Court finds it has no alternative but to dismiss the action and dissolve the injunction, and it will be so ordered. And the Defendants may submit an order within seven days."

> jurisdictions (citations omitted). This rule contemplates a presumption that the best interest of the child lie with the natural parent, but that this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In Re Confessora B., supra.
>
> The Georgia law, however has not followed this pattern. The best interest of the child test is used only between parents who both have equal right to the child. Code Ann. 74-107; *Knox v. Knox*, 226 Ga. 619, 176 S.E.2d 712 (1970). Where the dispute is between a natural parent and a third party, on the other hand, the Court must award the custody of the child to the parent unless he has lost his parental prerogatives under Code Annotated § 74-108 or is unfit, *Edwards v. Cason*, ____ Ga. ____, ____ S.E.2d ____, Case No. 31130, decided June 22, 1976. (Other citations omitted).
>
> The Drummonds . . . misconstrued the Georgia law in assuming that the best interest of a child rule applies to foster parents. Without this test and its focus on the child, there is no basis for recognizing any right in the 'psychological parents.' Since the focus in determining whether a third party is entitled to custody is on the natural parents and whether or not they have forfeited their rights or are unfit . . . any relationship between the child and his foster parents is primarily irrelevant. *Stuckey v. Jones*, 212 Ga. 495, 93 S.E.2d 719 (1956); *Watkins v. Caroll*, 196 Ga. 651, 27 S.E.2d 329 (1948). . . .
>
> We thus find no merit in the Drummonds' claim of right by virtue of their status as Timmy's foster parents. The trial court did not err, as alleged in Enumeration 3, in denying any legal rights to foster parents who have cared for a child for more than two years and are his psychological parents.
>
> Enumeration of Error 7 urging that the trial court erred in holding that the Drummonds were not denied due process or equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment must also fall under our holding that foster parents have no rights to adopt a foster child and thus no right to contest the agency's withholding of consent."

The Georgia Court then dismissed the Drummonds' claim to due process on the theory that their right to adopt a child under Code Annotated Section 74-402 is a "protectable interest" which the Court stated was limited by the principles announced in *Bd. of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Court then said:

"They in fact were given the right to apply, they were interviewed and the application denied. As we have already noted, the agency's discretion as to which adoptive family will be chosen is absolute and the Drummonds have no rights beyond being considered. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that property interests are defined by state law. *Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra.* The law of Georgia provides no rights in foster parents to adopt."

The Court then further concludes:

"We thus find no basis for due process protections in favor of the Drummonds, and the equal protection arguments must also fall for the same reasons."

II. "LIBERTY" RIGHTS AS REQUIRING DUE PROCESS

As the trial court recognized, a state statute or state policy that every child having mixed black and white parentage could not be adopted by a white family could not be countenanced under the United States Constitution. In *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1 (1966), speaking of a state statute that prohibited the intermarriage of black and white persons, the Court said:

"These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival. *Skinner v. Oklahoma*, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also *Maynard v. Hill*, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State. . . ."

While not as fundamental as the right to marry, the right "to . . . establish a home and bring up children . . ." has been stated in *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), to come within the concept of liberty as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. While focusing principally on property rights in *Bd. of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564 (1971), the Supreme Court nevertheless discussed the concept of liberty as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment:

" 'While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own con-

science, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390, 399. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed. See, *e.g.*, *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500; *Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645."

In *Bolling v. Sharpe*, 347 U.S. 497 where an attack was made on the District of Columbia's segregated school system, the Court discussed the interplay of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. The Court there said:

"The 'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases but, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.[2] (Citing *Detroit Bank v. United States*, 317 U.S. 329; *Currin v. Wallace*, 306 U.S. 1, 13-14; *Steward Machine Co. v. Davis*, 301 U.S. 548, 585).

Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.[3] (Citing *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214, 216; *Hirabayshi v. United States*, 320 U.S. 81, 100). As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle 'that the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race.' [4] (Citing *Gibson v. Mississippi*, 162 U.S. 565, 591. Cf. *Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.*, 323 U.S. 192, 198-199). And in *Buchanan v. Warley*, 245 U.S. 60, the Court held that a statute which limited the right of a property owner to convey his property to a person

of another race was, as an unreasonable discrimination, a denial of due process of law.

Although the Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with any great precision, that term is not confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint. Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause." 347 U.S. at 499.

While it is true, as stated by the Georgia Supreme Court, that property rights that are protectable under the due process clause of the Constitution are generally created by state law, a determination of what is a "liberty" interest has been a matter of federal constitutional law. *Meyer v. Nebraska, supra; Bolling v. Sharpe, supra; Stanley v. Illinois*, 405 U.S. 645. Thus, while this Court recognizes the Georgia Supreme Court's decision that the Drummonds have no "property" interest in their plea to adopt Timmy, arising from their being "psychological parents" of the child, the absence of such right does not foreclose the claim that they have a "liberty" right of which the State cannot deprive them without a due process hearing. It seems clear that a person who seeks to exercise the right enjoyed by all other persons to adopt a child has the same liberty interest to protect as does a person who seeks the right to marry. Neither can be denied or hedged about by arbitrary classifications, nor solely on the basis of race.

III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Furthermore, the Drummonds claim that even should the Court decide that they have no liberty right to be protected by the due process clause, they nevertheless are entitled to the benefits of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They say that this right has been denied them because they have been denied the opportunity to adopt a mixed race child because of a rule or policy of the defendant Board that such a child will, as a matter of course, be placed for adoption only with black parents, if available. They say further that whether such policy exists and was the basis for the rejection of their claim to adopt Timmy could not be resolved in the manner in which the defendants acted, but can be determined only after a hearing before an adequate state administrator or tribunal with at least minimal procedural due process.

The defendants contend that the record, which we have attempted to outline above, supports the trial court's determination that the defendants did not use the factor of race impermissibly in denying the Drummonds' right to adopt the child. They further argue that there is no protectable interest under the Fourteenth Amendment of which the state action has deprived them. Thus, they contend that no process is due in the decisionmaking that resulted in their denial. Furthermore, they argue that even though the Drummonds assert that they have been denied equal protection of the laws by reason of an alleged racial policy for excluding the Drummonds with respect to this child, this does not entitle them to any hearing that would meet minimal due process requirements.

As is already clearly indicated, neither the Drummonds nor Timmy were accorded elemental due process in the proceedings that resulted in the termination of the Drummonds' familial relationship with the child and in his being finally and irreversibly taken away from the only parents he had known during his infancy. It is apparent that such decisions as were made were made ad hoc by discussions, conferences or committee votes without those participating having any established standards for decisionmaking. Moreover, it is perfectly clear that the record now available is strongly suggestive of the fact that the decision was made before the first time the Drummonds were interviewed and that at no time thereafter were they given an opportunity to meet any set of required standards either by evidence or other proof. As a result, it is impossible to determine what actual ingredients went into the decision that was finally made to deny the Drummonds the right to adopt the child. The one recurring theme that more than arguably runs throughout the record is the one dealing with race and the desire of the caseworkers and supervisors to explain to the Drummonds *not what other reasons existed for their not being permitted to keep Timmy, but to explain to them why the underlying policy existed*, such policy allegedly being that if a black family was available, a black or mixed race child would be placed with such family rather than with a white family. As we have already noted, such a policy would be impermissible but no one can say with any assurance on this record that any other factor was the basis of the final action taken.

We have already discussed the existence of a liberty interest in the Drummonds. We now turn to the question whether their contention that they have been denied

equal protection of the laws because of the alleged policy of the defendants entitles them to a hearing. This Court has recently held that in the field of state employment, a non-tenured teacher is entitled to a due process hearing where he "asserts that he has been dismissed for constitutionally impermissible reasons." The Court held this in a case in which it also decided that such teacher had no such reasonable expectation of employment as would bring him within the rule of *Bd. of Regents v. Roth, supra.* In *Megill v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Florida* (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 1976, No. 74-3273), this Court said:

> "With respect to the requirement of a hearing and the adequacy thereof, in *Thaw v. Board of Public Instruction*, 432 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1970), this Court stated that a school board is required to provide notice and hearing before dismissing a public schoolteacher or college professor in two types of cases. The first type is when a teacher has tenure or a reasonable expectation of reemployment. *Ferguson v. Thomas*, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970). The second type is when a teacher without tenure or expectancy of reemployment asserts that he has been dismissed for constitutionally impermissible reasons. *Pred v. Board of Public Instruction*, 415 F.2d 851, 856 (5th Cir. 1969). This case falls into the second category."

In *Megill*, the plaintiff first alleged that he was entitled to be rehired as a teacher by the Board of Regents of the State of Florida unless he could be found after a due process hearing to have been denied a position for cause. He also alleged that the actual ground of his failure to be rehired was his expression of opinion and vocal criticism of the institution which would be a denial based upon his exercise of his First Amendment rights. This Court held that because Megill had no form of tenure or right to continued employment beyond the term of his contract

he did not have the requisite "property" interest in being rehired upon which to base a claim to constitutional due process. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that since he "assert[ed] that he has been dismissed for constitutionally impermissible reasons" he was entitled to procedural due process.

Here, an allegation that the basis of the defendants' action was the impermissible basis of race may be equated with the assertion in *Megill* of "constitutionally impermissible reasons."

We conclude that it was just not possible for the trial court, here, to determine whether proper criteria were used by the defendants in denying the Drummonds the right of adoption. This follows from the fact that no amount of analysis or explanation of the documents prepared and utilized by the defendants would support a finding of any basis on which they actually decided that the Drummonds were not suitable as adoptive parents. Several possible reasons were suggested by different staff workers at different times. It is clear that the Drummonds knew from the start that foster parents were not normally considered to be desirable as adoptive parents. However, there is no statement or fact finding or determination that this fact was the basis for the denial. Neither is there any statement to the effect that the Drummonds' age was a basis for the decision. All of this follows, of course, from the fact that no responsible official either made or recorded the actual reasons. The fact that the defendants might have based their action on some fact other than race, cannot be accepted as a substitute for a finding or determination on a record that is adequate for review, that such cause or causes actually brought about the result.

We conclude that under the law of this Circuit as announced in *Megill*, the Drummonds are entitled to have a hearing with at least some of the elements of procedural due process before they can be bound by a bald determination (which, in fact, was not even made by the defendants here) that no impermissible standards of race controlled their action.[4] Moreover, although it may not have been a basis for decision in *Bolling v. Sharpe, supra*, the Court's language in discussing the two provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment seems to be applicable here. This, we think, is a case in which the alleged "discrimination [is] so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process," 347 U.S. 497, 499.

Our determination that the Drummonds have a liberty interest of which they cannot be deprived without a due process hearing is in accord with a judgment of a three-judge district court of the Southern District of New York in *Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform* and *Shapiro v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform* (*probable jurisdiction noted* ____ U.S. ____ 45 L.W. 3272.[5]

There were other circumstances in the New York case which do not appear in the case before us. In its disposition of the case on appeal, therefore, the Supreme Court may not reach the precise questions with which we deal here. In the New York cases, the three-judge court was dealing with state statutes and also with a provision that

---

[4] The nature of such hearing, while primarily a matter for the administrative officials to provide, will be discussed more fully *infra*.

[5] No better citation for these cases can be given. They appeared in the advance sheets at 411 F.Supp. 1144, but they do not appear in the bound volumes. As indicated, the Supreme Court to which a direct appeal, of course, lies from the three-judge court decision, entered an order noting probable jurisdiction on October 12, 1976.

afforded very substantial elements of procedural due process as to some of the parties in that litigation. Moreover, the problem of racial discrimination was not involved. In view of the need for as prompt action as may be reasonably possible, we consider it not inappropriate to proceed to a judgment in this case without awaiting the action by the Supreme Court in *Smith* and *Shapiro*.

IV. TIMMY'S RIGHTS

Immediately upon the filing of the order of the district court, Mr. and Mrs. Drummond filed their notice of appeal and filed a motion for an injunction pending appeal, seeking to prohibit the defendants from removing Timmy from their care until the case is disposed of on the merits on appeal. This court denied the injunction, holding that it did not appear that the Drummonds met the strict requirements for a stay pending appeal, that determination having been made apparently largely on the conclusion of the court that at that stage of the proceeding it did not appear that there was a likelihood of their prevailing on the merits on appeal. Nevertheless, the court ordered the case placed on the docket for an expedited hearing and concluded with the following order:

> "Therefore, it is further ordered that an attorney shall be appointed to represent the interests of the child Timmy before this Court. *Cf. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform v. Dumpson*, ____ F.Supp. ____ (S.D.N.Y. 1976)."

Pursuant to this order of the court, Alan R. Turem, Esq. was appointed "to represent the interests of the child Timmy before this Court in this case" on July 2, 1976.

Pursuant to that appointment, counsel filed an exhaustive brief undertaking to show wherein Timmy had

a critical interest in the outcome of the litigation and that such interest was one that might not be adequately vindicated by either the appellants, the Drummonds, or the defendants, the Fulton County Department of Family and Children's Services and individual officials. Counsel also filed a motion with this Court for permission to intervene in the litigation. The merits of this contention have already been recognized by this Court in its order of May 19 which stated: "We also recognize that the interests of the individual who will be most affected by the ultimate decision in this case may not be coextensive with those of either of the former parties."

Timmy's counsel argues that Timmy, as a child, is entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection generally, despite his essential "ward" status created pursuant to the state's parens patriae power, citing *In Re Gault*, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). He has also alleged a specific protectable interest under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By reference to several Georgia Supreme Court cases, *i.e.*, *Elrod v. Hall Co. Dept. of Family & Children's Services*, 136 Ga. App. 251, 220 S.E.2d 726 (1975) and *In Re Levi*, 131 Ga. App. 348, 206 S.E.2d 82 (1974), he confects a "right" which he chooses to denominate a "right to a stable environment." Moreover, the Department's brief seems to recognize the existence of such a right in a child at least up to the time of the legal proceedings which terminate the natural parents' rights to the child. Appellee's brief states:

> "The Department recognizes the existence of children's rights . . . and specifically recognizes that Timmy has due process rights involved in the juvenile system."

The apparent difference between the position of the two parties here is that the defendants take the position that

due process is afforded such a child as Timmy by the entire "juvenile system" of the State of Georgia which provides that the termination of the parents' rights occurs only in court with full procedural protection and that adoption occurs only in the same manner, that is to say in a court proceeding where full procedural rights are afforded the child. On the other hand, Timmy's counsel contends that at any critical stage of the proceedings between termination and final adoption, procedural due process must exist if, in fact, at such stage Timmy's future life, security and stability are irrevocably changed. Such a stage, they contend, was reached when the defendants undertook to deny permanently and irrevocably the right of the Drummond family, the only parents Timmy knew, the right to adopt the child.

It cannot be gainsaid in light of what has already been stated, that Timmy fully meets the requirements of Rule 24(a), F.R.C.P. which provides as follows:

> "(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (a) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."

In discharging the duties for which he was appointed by this Court, counsel seeks to have this Court permit Timmy's intervention and further seeks to have the trial court's judgment vacated and the case remanded on the ground that the child's rights could not be irrevocably affected by the defendants without a hearing conducted in accordance with the mandates of due process. Thus,

the relief sought by both appellants and Timmy coincide on this appeal.[6]

We conclude that Timmy should be permitted to intervene and that this shall be accomplished by an order of the trial court on remand, which court will also determine the need of having a guardian ad litem appointed in addition to having counsel represent the child. The trial court shall also determine by order the minimum requirements for the holding of a due process hearing within the administrative agency which will give to all interested parties a full opportunity to be heard, to inquire into the policies, customs and procedures that prevail with regard to a child of Timmy's characteristics and into the qualifications of the foster parents as claimants of the right to adopt Timmy. Optimistically, these parts of the trial court's order can be arrived at by agreement or upon submission of a plan or procedure by the parties.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that both the foster parents having a close familial relationship during the first years of this child's life and the child himself have a protectable interest under the Fourteenth Amendment which cannot be denied them without due process of law. We also conclude that their contentions that they have been denied equal protection of the laws because their joint familial relationship had been broken by state action solely on account of race requires a due process hearing to deter-

[6] The appellants, in addition, seek a reversal of the trial court's determination, and seek a decision by this Court that race played an impermissible part in the action of the defendants. The absence of a hearing dealing with this issue within the administrative agency makes impossible a decision by us either in favor of the appellants or the appellees on this issue.

mine the truth or falsity of this contention. We also conclude that Timmy has a right to intervene by proper order in the trial court.

The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The motion by Timmy's counsel for the issuance of this Court's writ of habeas corpus and the motion that this Court hold the original defendants in contempt of court for failure to make the child available to them are DENIED.

The motion for attorney's fees has not been fully briefed and it will be disposed of later.

The mandate of the Court will issue forthwith.

Judge Roney dissents and will file his opinion later.

RONEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I regret that the press of court business prevented the preparation of this dissent in time for distribution with the majority opinion; and that there has not been even now time to fully develop the premises for this Federal consideration of a state matter so complex.

The majority opinion opens with a question that simply is not asked in this case.[1] The question accurately put is this: may a state agency, charged with the responsibility of placing for adoption a child in its legal custody, take into consideration the race of the child and the race of prospective adoptive parents without violating the Constitution of the United States?

[1] The majority opinion states: this appeal presents the question whether the federal courts can give relief to white foster parents who contend that they have been unconstitutionally denied by Georgia state officials the right to adopt a mixed race child solely on account of race.

We are not confronted with a statute that makes interracial adoptions illegal, *Compos v. McKeithen*, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court); nor with a private adoption in which the state investigatory agency has withheld consent because of race, *see* Ga. Code Ann. § 74-403(4) (1973); nor with a state court decision that an adoption cannot take place because of ethnic origin disparity between a white child and a black stepfather, who was the natural mother's second husband, *see In re Adoption of a Minor*, 228 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1955); nor, for that matter, with the question of whether an agency with legal custody of a child can use race as an automatic, and therefore the sole basis, for denying the application of prospective adoptive parents to adopt a particular child. The finding of fact by the district court that race was not the sole basis for denying the application of the Drummonds for *this* child is not clearly erroneous, and the appellants do not so contend.[2] In fact, the district

[2] Paragraph 9 of the Complaint states:

> 9. Defendants' refusal to place said child with Plaintiffs for adoption, based solely on racial grounds, is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws and an unlawful violation of the civil rights of Plaintiffs.

District court's verbal order:

> "THE COURT: All right, I'll rule for the defendants. This case comes to the Court on a complaint, the crux of which is that the defendant's refusal to place said child with plaintiffs for adoption, based solely on racial grounds, is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws and an unlawful violation of the civil rights of the plaintiffs.
>
> Therefore, the issue before the Court is to determine whether the decision of the Department of Fulton County Department of Family and Children Services was one solely based upon the impermissible criteria of race, or whether the race, to the extent that it entered into the decision, was only that legitimate consideration thereof which is—which the Court holds necessarily as required in determining the proper placement of a child."

At oral argument before this Court, appellants' attorney conceded that the record would not support a finding that the agency decision was based solely on race.

court viewed the law as prohibiting an automatic-type placement of black with black, white with white or mixed race with black. Because the record does not support the application by the agency of an automatic rule, no question as to automatic standards is before us for review.

The record does support the fact that race was taken into consideration in a rather substantial way in the agency decision that the child would be better placed in a home other than the plaintiffs'. The question is whether the agency, not acting under the imperative of any law or unyielding automatic rule, but rather in the exercise of its own discretionary concepts of successful child placement, may constitutionally take into consideration as an important factor the race of the child and prospective parents. By the force of its decision, the majority must conclude that such action by a state agency violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. For without that concept upon which to base a § 1983 claim, the plaintiffs have no federal case.

On this narrow point of constitutional law I would affirm the decision of the district court. No interpretation of the Constitution by any case cited to this Court prevents a state child placement agency from looking to the best interests of a child in its custody, as judged by agency determined criteria, in deciding where that child should be placed for permanent adoption. If the agency decides that physical characteristics of prospective adoptive parents in relation to those of the child are important criteria for protecting the best interests of the child, the Constitution does not prevent it. To permit consideration of physical characteristics necessarily carries with it permission to consider racial characteristics. This record reflects nothing more than a large number of agency and social workers with unquestioned credentials endeavoring

to find a permanent family home for Timmy that would be best for him for the rest of his life.

Consider first the due process claims of the Drummonds. The majority concedes that under Georgia law there is no property right of foster parents to adopt their foster child. *See Drummond v. Fulton Co.*, 237 Ga. 449, 228 S.E.2d 839 (1976). The majority then proceeds to ascertain if there is any liberty interest at stake requiring due process protection. It finds such an interest under *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). But *Loving* involved an individual's liberty interest in choosing whomever he wishes to marry regardless of race. It did not deny an individual's liberty right to refuse to marry someone not of his choosing. Accordingly, if the Drummonds have a liberty right in choosing a prospective adopted child, regardless of race, so, too, does Timmy have a liberty right in choosing the best suitable parents. There is little doubt, now, that a child in Georgia would have a constitutional right to be adopted by parents of any race that he chose. But if it is a true "liberty" interest, he has the right not to be adopted by parents of a given race. And he has a right to exercise that right solely in terms of his own best interests. Because an infant is incapable of exercising that right for himself, however, under Georgia law either the parents who voluntarily give up a child for adoption or the agency given legal custody of a child must exercise that right for him.[3] Thus the reliance on *Loving*

[3] Under Georgia law, once the parental rights of a child's biological parents have been terminated, substantial authority is provided to the agency which assumes the care of the child. Ga. Code Ann. § 24A-3204 (1976) provides that: "If, upon entering an order terminating the parental rights of a parent, there is no parent having parental rights, the court shall commit the child to the custody of the Division of Children and Youth or a licensed child-placing agency, . . .

to give the Drummonds a due process liberty right in connection with adopting a child must also be extended to give the child, through his natural parents or the state as his legal custodian, a corresponding due process liberty right.

Moreover, to the extent that *Loving* is a due process case, it is a *substantive* due process case, in which a state statutory scheme barring interracial marriages was struck down as being inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional basis for the Court's holding was that the freedom of choice to marry, or not to marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by invidious racial discriminations imposed by the state. The case was not a *procedural* due process decision. The Supreme Court did not suggest that by some amount of procedural due process, notice, hearings, impartial hearing officers, record and review, Loving

The custodian has authority to consent to the adoption of the child, his marriage, his enlistment in the armed forces of the United States and surgical and other medical treatment for the child." Supplementing these powers are the further rights of the custodian set out in Ga. Code Ann. § 24A-2901 (1976): "A custodian to whom legal custody has been given by the court under this Code [Title 24A] has the right to physical custody of the child, the right to determine the nature of the care and treatment of the child, including ordinary medical care and the right and duty to provide for the care, protection, training and education, and the physical, mental and moral welfare of the child, . . ." Georgia is not alone in this delegation of full parental powers to an agency which has been awarded custody of a child. *See e.g.*, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.052 (Supp. 1976); Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-9 (1972). This is consistent with the general rule that where the natural parents of a child are unfit, the state may assume custody of the child, 59 Am. Jur. 2d, *Parent and Child* § 39 (1971), with custody being defined as "the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child including his care. It includes the right to the child's services and earnings, and the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and religion." 59 Am. Jur. 2d, *Parent and Child* § 25 (1971).

could have been deprived of the right to marry the one who wanted to marry him. *Loving* is not authority for declaring that foster parents have a due process right to a hearing before a child placed in their care can be removed from their home, or before their application for a particular child, in which the state law gives the foster parents no legal interest, can be refused.

To the extent that the contention is made that the Drummonds are entitled to minimal due process before their application for adoption of any child can be denied, in my view, such due process as was due was rendered. The record fully supports the fact that complete consideration was given to the Drummonds' application to adopt Timmy. The agency clearly had no per se rule against placing a black or mixed race child in a white home, as indicated by the fact that it had previously made such a placement and the additional fact that the record shows serious consideration of the Drummonds as adoptive parents. Their application was not dismissed out of hand, or treated arbitrarily. Extensive and long-term investigations were made of the conditions in the Drummonds' home to determine if this type of placement would work in this case. A total of eighteen persons were involved in providing input into what emerged as a group consensus. The Drummonds were not without their partisans in the decisive meeting. The ultimate decision was not made in an informational vacuum. The social workers who made the decision about Timmy and the Drummonds were more intimately acquainted with them, their past history and any potential problems, than any hearing officer could ever be. I think that this form of rational decision making is all that is required. Due process does not mean the kind of adversarial hearing with which courts are so

familiar. The factors that must be weighed in deciding if a mixed race child could have a successful life in a particular white home are so complex and ephemeral that adversarial procedures are inappropriate.

The case-worker system of social service established by the state for the processing of these very difficult personal and social decisions should not be destroyed under a constitutional edict. Limitations of time, money and human resources may well dictate the methodology of the state agency, but as long as all legal interests of the parties are reasonably protected, the state procedure is not subject to constitutional supervision.

The attorney appointed by this Court to represent Timmy on this appeal argues that Timmy is entitled to a due process hearing upon any change in foster home care regardless of the Drummonds' interest. The suggestion that such a position is supported by *In re Gault*, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), and *McKeiver v. Pennsylvania*, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), is misplaced. In each of those cases and their progeny, the children involved had run afoul of the laws of the state, laws in which the state had an enforcement interest. The rights of the juvenile were in conflict with the state interest in enforcing its own laws. Such due process cases are inapplicable to a case such as this, where the state interest in finding the best home for Timmy coincides perfectly with his interest. Some adult must make the decision for him. Nothing here has shown that an adult court-appointed guardian ad litem and an attorney of his own could better protect this interest than the mechanism which has been established by the state. Certainly a difference, if one exists, does not support a declaration that one is constitutional and the other not. Whether the record made before the state agency suits the needs of a

federal judiciary, which has no general authority for review and no supervisory powers over the operation of the agency, should be irrelevant.

The other area in which the majority finds entitlement to a hearing is the equal protection clause. Relying on *Megill v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Florida*, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), the majority finds a right to a hearing in that the decision against allowing the Drummonds to adopt Timmy was made for constitutionally impermissible reasons, to wit, racial matching of parent and child. The majority concludes that it is impossible to ascertain just what factors were used in reaching the decision but, because constitutionally impermissible ones might have been decisive, the Drummonds are therefore entitled to a hearing.

Reliance on *Megill*, however, necessitates adherence to the fundamental proposition asserted by appellants that race cannot be used as a substantial factor in the agency's placement decision. The Drummonds would be entitled to a hearing under *Megill* only if the use of race as one of several factors is constitutionally impermissible. I do not think that it is. As one court has already noted, "we regard the difficulties inherent in interracial adoption as justifying consideration of race as a relevant factor in adoption, . . . " *Compos v. McKeithen*, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court).[4]

[4] The controversy in the social service world is well documented. In an effort to find permanent homes for all children, particularly the thousands of homeless black and mixed race children, many adoption agencies and social workers have encouraged transracial adoptions as a solution to this most urgent problem. Chastang, *The Dilemma of Biracial Adoption*, 17 Social Work 100 (May 1972); Jones, *On Transracial Adoption of Black Children*, 51 Child Welfare 156 (March 1972). Transracial adoptions began in the early 1950s and increased in volume during the 1960s. Grow & Shapiro, Black Children-White Parents 1 (1974). Despite their growing popularity, transracial adoptions have been very controversial and are regarded by some as only a second-best alternative, and by others as not a viable alternative at all, in light of today's social realities. *See* Klibanoff, Let's Talk About Adoption 119-121 (1973); Chastang, *supra;* Jones, *supra.* In the spring of 1972, at its first annual convention, the National Association of Black Social Workers expressed its "vehement opposition to the practice of placing black children with white families." Grow & Shapiro, *supra*, at 5. The Child Welfare League of America, although emphasizing that inracial placement is preferable since "in today's social climate, children placed in adoptive families with similar racial characteristics can become more easily integrated into the average family group and community," *CWLA Standards for Adoption Service* 92 (revised 1973), undertook to study a sample of transracial adoptions and found "apparent success" in the large majority. *See* Grow & Shapiro, *supra.* The relative degree of success, however, depended on many variables, including among others the parents' attitude, the size of the family, the parents' occupations, the motivation for adoption, the child's intellectual level, the community's characteristics, which tend to indicate the important role the agency must play in weighing these factors when placing a black or mixed race child in a white home. *See* Grossman, *A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings*, 17 Buffalo L. Rev. 303 (1968).

This case is an unusually difficult one because the legal problems it poses are fraught with emotional overtones. The Drummonds are admirable people. They grew to love Timmy and bestowed upon him the care and warmth so needed by young children. They exemplified the highest goals of foster home care. But foster home care and permanent adoptive homes serve different functions for children. The qualities for one may differ considerably from the qualities for another. After extensive investigation and deliberation, the agency charged with protecting Timmy's welfare ultimately concluded that the interests of Timmy would be best served by placing him permanently in another adoptive home. The question before us is not whether that decision was correct. *Cf. Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Tragic as the agency's

considered decision was for the Drummonds, I would hold that it did not deprive the Drummonds of any protectable Federal interest. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.